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 The Arab Spring was a phenomenon that shocked the international community. 
Starting with Tunisia in December of 2010, the citizens of Egypt, Libya, and Iran all 
voiced dissatisfaction with their governing leaders within the same period. The massive 
protests and demonstrations that broke out would soon prove to be different from the 
protests that occurred in the 1970s. What the world witnessed from December 2010 to 
February 2011 were calls for the resignation of authoritarian leaders and a new 
democratic government. The calls symbolized a new wave of potential Muslim 
democracies that would test the U.S. theory of liberal democracy. Today, Muslim 
democracies in the Arab world are marginal due to a lack of sustainability. Further, the 
development of these countries democratic transitions could determine the future of 
Muslim democracies in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region.  
The chain reaction of events in the Arab Spring showed the world that the citizens 
were ready to regain control over their countries. After decades of being under 
authoritarian regimes, why did the uprisings occur at that time and what implications did 
they have on the future of Muslim democracies? This research question is explored in 
three chapters that examine and analyze the potential answers. The chapters draw upon 
theory, scholarly writings, and international news sources. The Arab Spring is continuing 
to develop in the MENA region, which makes credible international news sources crucial 
to this analysis. The theoretical composition of this thesis includes the discussions of 
revolution, liberal democracy, Islam and secularism.  
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The results of this methodology present essential factors that will be imperative to 
the sustainability of future Muslim democracies. The factors include pre-existing 
conditions, political Islam, foreign intervention, the military’s role, Islamic political 
organizations, secularism and a transformation in political culture. The conclusion asserts 
these factors have contributed to the occurrence of the uprisings and further will act as 
the determinants of sustainability for future Muslim democracies in MENA region. In 
addition to the events of the Arab Spring providing new implications that test the 
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 Civil unrest, limited freedoms, Islamic extremists, military regimes and 
longstanding dictatorships are all features of the Arab Spring, witnessed in the Middle 
East North Africa (MENA) region. In the 21st century, the world witnessed citizens in 
countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Iran and others, express their discontent with 
their existing governments. Similar protests and demonstrations were seen in the 1970s, 
but the results of the Arab Spring have introduced new implications on the United States 
(U.S) theory of liberal democracy. The discontent was expressed in the form of massive 
protests and demonstrations that would eventually lead to the resignation of dictators in 
Tunisia and Egypt as well as arrests. The uprisings in Libya resulted in the assassination 
of dictator, Muammar Qaddafi in the midst of chaotic international intervention.  
 Since the ousting of those dictators, the unraveling of the Arab Spring has 
continued present challenges in Muslim democracies compatibility with a liberal 
democracy. Overall, the progression of the Arab Spring has been quite marginal in 
respects to establishing democracies beyond elections and further sustaining order. 
Therefore, this research seeks to an in-depth analysis of why the events of the Arab 
Spring occurred and what implications can be drawn on the future of Muslim 
democracies. Through the study of both research questions, theories, the compatibility 
between Islam and liberal democracy, and additional factors such as the military’s role, 
Islamic political organizations and secularism and all examined. The analysis of liberal 
democracy is centered upon Islam’s initial challenges with secular pluralism. This thesis 
will examine the events and outcomes of the Arab Spring to analyze the implications on 
Muslim politics and democracy in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Iran and Turkey. The study of 
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these implications is examined in three chapters: 1) The Revolts and Protests of the Arab 
Spring — Before America? Tunisia, Egypt, Libya — Iran 2) Can Islam and Liberal 
Democracy coexist? A Case Study of Tunisia, Egypt, and Turkey 3) Tunisia’s Progress 
and Egypt’s Steps Backwards. 
 Chapter One titled “The Revolts and Protests of the Arab Spring — Before 
America? Tunisia, Egypt, Libya – Iran,” takes a historical approach to examine the 
uprisings. This chapter seeks reasons for why the events of the Arab Spring occurred and 
if the U.S. promotion of democracy in Iraq acted as a catalyst for the Arab Spring. Critics 
of the Arab Spring argue the success of the Iraqi democracy is a result of the U.S. 
promotion of democracy in the region. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, this chapter 
argues the uprisings occurred because of other pre-existing conditions beyond the U.S. 
promotion of democracy such as political oppression, poverty, and ethnic conflicts.   
 The chapter begins with a literature review to present theoretical implications who 
why and how the uprisings occurred. This review prompts the discussion of the 
differentiating factors between revolution and protests. In doing so, the countries of the 
Arab Spring are categorized based on if the uprisings resulted in massive protests or the 
resignation by the president and calls for a new government. Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya 
all experienced actual revolutions, while Iran went through a series of massive protest 
that the military were finally able to subdue. The analysis of revolutions is continued with 
the element of cultures. Since the pre-existing conditions of the Arab Spring were not 
new, there was a culture transformation that took place within the people, in order for the 
uprisings to occur. Next, the question of how the protesters were able to mobilize is 
discussed by analyzing the micromobilization, rational choice, and the domino theory. 
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The micro-mobilization assists in understanding how the use of social media during the 
uprisings allowed protesters to gain support and show people their daily reality. The 
rational choice theory provides support for why the people decided to join in the streets 
and on social media to protest the injustices. Lastly, the domino theory explains the 
geographic impact of the Arab Spring. 
    The question of why the citizens of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and even Iran chose to 
protest and rise up against their existing state still remains. In order to answer this 
question, it is imperative to do an analysis of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and even Iran to 
examine what life was like for these citizens leading up to the uprisings. This study 
uncovers the pre-existing conditions that explain why the uprisings happened beyond the 
U.S. promotion of democracy. The dictators in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya ruled for more 
than 20 years. Overtime, each president, amended the constitution to guarantee he would 
stay in power while implementing laws that restricted the freedom of their citizens.  
 Iran has been chosen as an outlier for the study to examine why the country has not 
experienced a revolution since 1979. Through the analysis of the massive protests in 
2009, the government’s actions reveal a form of repression that has led to its ability to 
sustain power. However, as this chapter indicates, with the pre-existing conditions there 
could be a revolution in the future for Iran. This chapter concludes with recommendations 
for all the countries and a look to the future of their democratic transitions. Further, this 
study provides support for the pre-existing conditions of political oppression, poverty and 
ethnic conflicts acting as catalysts for the uprisings beyond the U.S. implementation of 
the Iraqi democracy.  
 Chapter 2 titled “Can Islam and Liberal Democracy coexist in Egypt and Tunisia? 
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A Case Study of Tunisia, Egypt, and Turkey,” examines specific reasons that have led to 
the lack of sustainability in Muslim democracies other than the historical pattern of 
authoritarian regimes regaining power in the Arab world, which leads critics to argue that 
Islam and democracy are not compatible. However, the question of compatibility lies 
within Islam and liberal democracy. The reason there are not more Muslim democracies 
is due to reasons beyond the conventional wisdom, such as political Islam, power, and 
past and present foreign intervention.  
 The study of these factors begins with defining Islam, liberal democracy and liberal 
autocracy. Islam discussed as a religion and then the ideology of political Islam. The 
analysis is used to provide a basis for understanding universal concepts of Islam and how 
the different interpretations are infused into the political arena. Liberal democracy is 
examined and defined as a system with that ensures liberties, rights and freedoms through 
equal participation, political competition, and legitimacy. Next, the theory of liberal 
autocracy presents the negative impacts foreign intervention due to the U.S. promotion of 
liberal democracy. Egypt and Tunisia are further discussed to examine if the countries 
have dealt with the issues of political Islam, power, and past and present foreign 
intervention. After, this analysis, the chapter focuses on Turkey’s history and why it 
could be considered a model for both countries. This chapter concludes with 
recommendations for Tunisia and Egypt based on the Turkish democracy.  
 The final chapter of this thesis examines what factors have led to Tunisia’s progress 
towards democracy and Egypt’s plague in democratization. Tunisia is continuing to 
progress in their steps towards democracy; however, Egypt seems to be spiraling out of 
control and even taken steps backwards in their democratization. Critics of the Arab 
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Spring attribute Egypt’s regression to support their claim that democratic transitions 
provide pathways for Islamist to resurge in governance. However, the case of Tunisia and 
Egypt provide two different perspectives of this conventional wisdom, which means there 
are other factors that would make Islamic governance positive or negative for the 
country. This chapter examines targets the additional factors of the military’s role in 
politics, Islamic political organizations and the cooperation between Islamist and 
Secularist.  
 Tunisia’s example shows democratic elections that result in Islamic governance can 
very well be positive for a country with the consideration of the other factors. On October 
23, 2011, the Ennadha party was victorious in winning the majority of seats in the 
Constituent Assembly. This victory had major implications on the drafting of the new 
constitution and the legislation that could be introduced. Overtime the party has faced a 
growing opposition and continued civil unrest; however, the Ennadha party has 
cooperated with other secular groups. The current Tunisian government is a prominent 
example of what can be accomplished when Islamist and Secularist work together. This 
study of Tunisia further shows a historical isolation of the military from politics and a 
deeply rooted encouragement of secularism. In addition to the marginal influence of 
Islamic political organizations have essentially led to Tunisia’s continued progress in 
democratization. 
 However, the case of Egypt presents the factors above in a different light. The 
Egyptian military is heavily involved in politics, the Muslim Brotherhood victory in 
electing President Mohamed Morsi resulted in tensions between the military and 
government, and the cooperation between Islamist and secularist has been marginal. The 
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analysis of Egypt shows the country’s regression provides support for critics that claim 
democratic transitions provide a path for Islamists to resurge in the state. However, this 
chapter provides a comparative analysis of Tunisia and Egypt to discuss the reasons 
beyond the conventional wisdom that have hindered the democratization for both 
countries at different times. This chapter concludes with recommendations based on the 
factors analyzed and predictions for the future of democracy in both countries. 
    The overarching theme of this thesis is centered how the events of the Arab Spring 
have prompted implications on the view of liberal democracy and the sustainability of 
future Muslim democracies. The chapters of this thesis address the factors of how and 
why the uprisings occurred, the compatibility of Islam and liberal democracy, and the 
military’s role in politics, Islamic political organizations, and the cooperation between 
Islamist and secularist. The study of the factors above examines the existing conventional 
wisdom and knowledge of the topic. However, since the Arab Spring is a more recent 
phenomenon, instead of disproving the existing theories, this thesis concludes with 
additional factors that provide justification for the events beyond the conventional 
wisdoms. As the countries continue to progress towards democracy, the factors addressed 
in this thesis must be monitored, in order to determine what new attributes of Muslim 
democracies will be revealed. The theory of Muslim democracy continues to expand 
because none the modern Muslim democracies are exactly alike. Essentially, this thesis 
shows additional attributes that will have to be considered examining the sustainability of 
Muslim democracies.   
 Overtime, the theory of liberal democracy has become complex the consensus 
amongst theorist that there are constraints on ensuring liberalism for all individuals. What 
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has been agreed upon to a certain extent is that democracy alone in regards free and fair 
elections and political competition is not enough to sustain democracy. The outcome of 
this study shows the new wave of Muslim Democracies test and even further challenge 
present challenges to the promotion of liberal democracy. The case of Egypt challenges 
the notion that democratic elections improve stability in the region and further provides 
reason that Muslim Democracies will require more than just elections to implement 
democracy. While free and fair elections are important, the study of the Arab Spring 
shows other factors such as equal participation and legitimacy that are key to ensuring the 
results of elections are effective. In addition to demonstrating, that democratic elections 
do not secure liberties, rights, and freedoms. Political competition presents a unique part 
in relation to the Arab Spring for several reasons. The former authoritarian regimes of the 
Arab Spring prohibited opposition parties from running in elections that made political 
competition nonexistent. However, as the third chapter conventional wisdom shows, 
democratic elections increase political competition and further open up room for Islamist 
to resurge. The study of Tunisia reveals political competition and Islamist in government 
can be positive for democratization.  
 Lastly, the events of the Arab Spring could not be examined without a debate on the 
compatibility of Islam and liberal democracy. This analysis reveals initial conflicts with 
traditionalist views of Islam and secular pluralism. Further this discussion reveals a 
change that is needed in the U.S. foreign policy in the promotion of liberal democracy. 
The study presents the reasons why Muslim democracies have not been sustainable in the 
past and how the Turkish democracy is a comparable model. The results of this align 
closely with the analysis of the cooperation between Islamist and secularist. In the 
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Tunisian government, the cooperation between both parties has allowed the country to 
continue to progress in democratic reforms. The conclusion of this thesis provides a 
synopsis of the thesis and its contribution to the study of Muslim Politics and Democracy. 
The main findings, methodologies and challenges to previous research are presented for 
each chapter. In addition to what aspects of the thesis are significant and can further lead 
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THE REVOLTS AND PROTESTSOF THE ARAB SPRING —BEFORE 
AMERICA? 




 Revolutions, civil war, and powerful authoritarian regimes are all relevant 
characteristics of the Middle East and Northern America (MENA) region. Powerful 
dictators ruled in the countries of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya with an authoritarian rule for 
over twenty years. Former president of Tunisia, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, ruled from 
1987 to 2011 when he was forced to flee the country due to massive protest.1 Hosni 
Mubarak former president in Egypt ruled from 1981 to 2011, when he was forced to flee 
the country due to the same reason.2 Muammar Qaddafi former statesmen of Libya ruled 
from 1969 to 2011, while the exact cause of his death remains unclear, Qaddafi and 
bodyguards were assassinated after attempting to flee in the midst of a North American 
Treaty Organization (NATO) airstrike in Sirte.3 In the case of Iran, multiple presidents 
have been impeached over the past century due to incompetency and citizen disapproval; 
however, there has not been a revolution since 1979.4The timing of the uprisings suggests 
there could have been commonalities in the citizen’s discontent. Have the citizens of 
these countries simply had enough of the oppressive regimes?  
In order to begin to answer this question, the term revolution must be defined and 
analyzed. Since the citizens of the Arab Spring were subject to autocratic rule for such as 
long period of time, there are implications of additional factors that encouraged the 
uprisings such as a change in culture. After analyzing the concept of revolution, then it 
                                                        
1Ghettas, L. The Geopolitical Repressions of the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution on North Africa. Report, 
International Affairs, Diplomacy and Strategy, 2011. 
2—. "Profile: Hosni Mubarak." May 24, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk (accessed April 30, 2012). 
3The Arab Spring: Rebellion, Revolution and a New World Order.  
4 Ibid. 
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will be easier to categorize the countries based on a revolution actually occurring or 
massive violent protests. What elements determine a revolution and how is one formed? 
This question will be answered by examining the micromobilization, rational choice, and 
domino theory. In doing so, the theories will provide support for the why the uprisings of 
the Arab Spring occurred and what implications can be drawn for future uprisings in the 
MENA region. Further this assessment acts as the theoretical framework for the analysis 
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 Revolutions can be industrial, military, religious, and political, with the intent to 
bring about drastic change in a political system and or a governing infrastructure. In 
analyzing the types of revolutions, empirical definitions such as the one above 
consistently surface. Lawrence Stone’s literature review entitled “Theories of 
Revolution” assesses historical views on revolution.5While Stone examines multiple 
definitions, revolution defined by Chalmers Johnson has been widely accepted by 
historians because of its vagueness. Johnson defined revolution as change in government, 
regime, or society due to the use of violence.6In this context, there is an indication of how 
revolutions and protests differ. Therefore, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have experienced 
some form of a revolution; however, Iran has only experienced a series of massive 
protests since the revolution of 1979.  Johnson’s definition is simplistic enough to 
provide a basic approach to categorizing the events within each country. This definition 
does not assert the outcome or the level of change in government that is needed for a 
revolution to be successful. Further critics of this definition could disagree with this 
assertion because Johnson’s definition does not provide any implications on what type of 
change is needed on a social level for a revolution to occur.  
 John Foran concluded to a similar consensus in his study of the Iranian 
Revolution. Foran believed there is a need for scholars to develop a better understanding 
of how culture, shared values, and ideologies become catalyst in the cause and outcomes 
                                                        
5 Stone, L. "Theories of Revolution." World Politics 18, no. 2 (June 1966): 159-176. 
6 Johnson, C. "Revolution and the Social System." Hoover Insitution Studies, 1964. 
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of revolutions.7The first important aspect in discussing the culture of the Arab Spring is 
the commonality of social classes within the protestors. The protestors were able to 
immediately establish a collective ideology because they were either from the working 
class or a part of the young educated population. Both social classes were caught in the 
midst of failing economies and high unemployment. Overtime, the citizens were 
promised relief from dictators through modernization, which fell short of reaching the 
lower classes of society and redistributing wealth. In addition to the continued constraints 
placed on liberties, religious minorities, and even women.  
The shared values and collective beliefs at the grass-root level significantly 
contributed to the outcomes of the revolutions. Historically, revolutions have proven to 
be successful in transforming society when there is a large support from the lower 
classes.8 This has been witnessed in Bolivia, Algeria, and Cambodia, when lower classes 
have experienced the overwhelming pressures of modernization.9 The pressures of 
modernization existed for decades prior to the uprisings but the transformation of culture 
in Arab Spring proved to be significant when the protestors committed to their 
ideological goals of a better society and to reform their current one. In addition to citizens 
witnessing neighboring countries protesting for the same democratic call and reformation 
in government. This presents the question of how did the citizens mobilize to form the 
massive protests and in turn revolutions?  
Micromobilization Theory 
  
                                                        
7 Ibid, “Theory and History of revolution.” 
8 Dix, R.H. The Varieties of Revolution. Comparative Politics, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Apr., 1983), pp. 281-294  
9 Ibid.  
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The micromobilization theory has emerged in recent decades as the ways of 
communicating have advanced through technology. Today, technology has developed 
across the world and people are able to communicate with one another in different 
countries using social networks such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. The power of 
communication through social networks allowed citizens to speak out about social 
injustices and develop petitions against oppressive regimes. Egyptian citizens created 
Facebook pages against the Hosni Mubarak in January of 2010, when a worker was 
brutality beaten by police.10 As time progressed the petitions and videos against the 
regime were posted all over the web, and Mubarak shut down Internet access throughout 
Egypt.11 Scholars such as Ihab el-Sakkout, Oxfam's Middle East Media Advisor, deemed 
social networks as important but not the actual driver of the revolutions; however, 
campaigns were posted on social networks prior to the massive protest in Cairo's Tahrir 
Square.12The creators of the social network campaigns were younger; college educated, 
and felt the effects of high unemployment rates and limitations on civil liberties.  
Prior to the social network campaigns from Egyptian college students, the video 
of a Tunisian man lighting himself on fire in front of the governor’s office sent a massive 
wave of enraged Tunisians to the streets.13 Mohamed Bouazizi, a fruit vendor, self-
immolated his self after police brutality attacked him and confiscated his fruit stand.14  
The video was uploaded to Facebook and went viral on the Internet, which resulted in an 
increased awareness of the situation. People commented, reposted and shared the video to 
                                                        
10 Bekkers, Victor, Rebecca Moody, and Arthur Edwards. "Micromobilization, Social Media, and Coping 
Strategies: Some Dutch Experiences." Policy and Internet 3, no. 155.4 (2011) 
11 Ibid. 
12 Elezz, M. A. "Social Networks; Catalyzers of Arab Spring." February 2, 2012. http://www.middle-east-
online.com (accessed May 3, 2012). 
13 Ibid. 
14 Worth, R. "How a Single Match an Ignite a revolution." New York Times. January 21, 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com (accessed May 4, 2012). 
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promote and gain support for the uprisings. The social network campaigns provided a 
platform for citizens to collaborate and form opposing informal groups. The occurrences 
in Egypt and Tunisia demonstrate how the two-way communications such as Facebook, 
allow individuals who are not necessarily affiliated with an organization or party to 
organize amongst themselves.15 The citizens of Egypt and Tunisia were able to connect, 
and mobilize using the Internet based on similar issues and overall goals, which was to 
remove the dictators and institute a democracy. The Micromobilization theory provides 
support for how people mobilized in the Arab Spring; therefore, the next theory will start 
the discussion on the citizen’s emotions behind the violent and massive demonstrations.  
Rational Choice Theory 
 
 The Rational Choice Theory (RCT) is described as an individuals being 
motivating by their wants and acting based on the information given to them about the 
conditions surrounding their actions.16 The uprisings of the Arab Spring were in pursuit 
of a change in government, living conditions, freedoms and liberties in the name of 
democracy. The campaigns and advocacy during the Arab Spring encouraged citizens to 
fight for change. The RCT also asserts that individuals must anticipate the different 
outcomes of their actions to determine the best action. The citizens were burdened with 
the reoccurring problems with their existing governments and essentially had to decide if 
they wanted to continue to deal with the oppression or fight for a better way of life. The 
uprisings in Tunisia influenced the protests seen in Egypt because the citizens were able 
to witness the power of massive protests. As a result, the citizens of the Arab Spring 
                                                        
15 Ibid, "Micromobilization, Social Media, and Coping Strategies: Some Dutch Experiences." 
16 Scott, J. From Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of The Present, edited by G. Browning, A. 
Halcli, and F. Webster. (Sage Publications, 2000). 
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witnessed the neighboring governments inability to control the massive uprisings, which 
in turn increased the benefits of protesting because it was working. Through the use of 
social network campaigns the incentives of ousting the regimes were presented; therefore, 
the citizens were more likely to dismiss uncertainties and sold on the possibility of a new 
way of life.  
 The rational choice to protest in the uprisings is also linked to the bandwagon 
model. The bandwagon model shows how social unrest on the grassroots level evolves 
into massive movements.17 The campaign and advocacy using social networks and other 
media outlets allowed people to develop relationships, coordinate plans, and express 
support for one another, which encouraged more people to join the movements. As 
people mobilize at an increasing rate, the bandwagon model asserts that when a major 
event such as a street vendor setting himself aflame in Tunisia, this ignites a reaction of 
massive protesters.18 The rational choice theory says that the decision of an action one 
chooses is based on cost and benefit of that action; however, if people are living in 
poverty, oppression, face religious and ethnic conflicts, the benefits of ousting an 
oppressive leader can override the monetary cost for the protestors.19 
Domino Theory 
 
 After analyzing why and how people make the decision to participate in 
revolutions, the final theory examines the geographical impact on the uprisings in the 
MENA. The domino theory asserts that changes and or events in one place will cause 
similar events in other areas close in proximity with one another. This theory has been 
                                                        
17 Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in Iranian Revolution American Sociological Review. 
1996. 132-152 
18 How a Single Match an Ignite a revolution. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com 
19 Ibid, “Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in Iranian Revolution.” 
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associated with foreign policy and political gains in American history under former 
president Dwight Eisenhower. Eisenhower’s “falling domino principle” asserted that a 
change in one country’s political institution would in turn transfer to neighboring 
countries.20 During his era of containment, this was crucial for the U.S. in spreading 
democracy to avoid the spread of communism by the Soviet Union. Decades later the 
promotion of democracy has continued through the lenses of the domino theory. The 
democracy domino theory carried out in Iraq by former president George W. Bush is 
discussed further in the chapter one. 
In the case of the Arab Spring, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya are geographically 
neighboring countries in the MENA. The uprisings, protests and revolutions, happened in 
a consecutive manner after citizens became aware of what was happening in their 
neighboring country. Mark Lynch, the creator of term Arab Spring, described the events 
between 2010 and 2011 as, “something where people who have been struggling and 
striving in a whole variety of creative and increasingly effective ways for at least a 
decade broke through.”21 While social media played a major role in the domino effect, 
activists were able to travel through these neighboring countries to rally support.22The 
domino theory explains how the uprisings influenced and affected each other based solely 
on geographic relation.  
Recommendations 
 The international community is adapting to the new era and collectively 
denouncing leaders accused of human rights abuses and social injustices. The actions of 
                                                        
20 Leeson, P.T. and Andrea M. Dean. The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation. 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Jul., 2009), pp. 533-551. 
21 Sheikh, A. "Arab Spring experts shares insight on Arab revolutions." The Lantern. May 3, 2012. 
http://www.thelantern.com (accessed May 1, 2012). 
22 Ibid. 
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citizens in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have encouraged this collectiveness and further 
increased global awareness. By using the theories of micromobilization, rational choice, 
and domino, there is clear indication that the Arab Spring is far from over. President 
Obama mentioned in his remarks on the Middle East North Africa (MENA) that these 
countries won their independence a long time ago but the people did not.23 With decades 
of built up resistance, the world is witnessing a massive wave of social unrest. The 
remaining oppressive regimes in the Arab world should examine the events of Arab 
Spring and be proactive in implementing reforms before it is too late.  
Conclusion 
 The theoretical framework to support and explain the revolutions throughout the 
Arab Spring is the theories of revolution, micromobilization, rational choice, and domino. 
The analysis of revolution reveals a transformation of culture in which citizens forcefully 
challenged the existing governments and demanded the removal of dictators in the name 
of democracy. This transformation was most powerful due to the collectiveness of ideals 
and shared value amongst the protestors, which in turn resulted in the actual revolutions. 
The micromobilization theory shows how the people exchanged their ideas, feelings, and 
gained support to collaborate in protests. Next, the rational choice theory explained why 
people decided to participate in uprisings due to a shared sentiment of oppression and the 
knowledge of the benefits in joining the protests. The rational choice theory further 
explains the bandwagon model that led to the massive crowds of people. Finally, the 
domino theory provides support for the uprisings being influenced by one another based 
on geographic location. The reasons for protest and revolution are founded upon the 
                                                        
23 Barack, Obama. "Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa." Washington: Office of 
the Press Secretary, May 19, 2011. 
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plight of democracy in the Arab Spring. While the theories present the starting point, the 
analysis divulges further to examine what specific reasons contributed to the events of the 
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THE REVOLTS AND PROTESTS OF THE ARAB SPRING — BEFORE 
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In the 21st century, the world has witnessed massive protests in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region, specifically, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Iran. The 
uprisings in these countries have been called, the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring is 
described as pro-democracy movements to overthrow longstanding oppressive 
governments.24The chain reaction of massive protests throughout the MENA sent shock 
waves across the Arab world. The uprisings in each country appeared to have influence 
on one another. However, the question of why the uprisings occurred is crucial to 
understanding the Arab Spring. The American view of the Arab Spring is linked to the 
United States (U.S.) led intervention in Iraq in March of 2003, which resulted in the 
implementation of an Iraqi democracy.25 Despite this view, the commonality of pre-
conditions such as political oppression, poverty, religious and ethnic conflicts present 
additional reasons for why the uprisings occurred.  
This research will examine arguments in support of the conventional wisdom then 
refute these arguments using the theoretical framework of the literature review. An in-
depth study of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Iran will follow to analyze the pre-conditions 
of political oppression, poverty, religious and ethnic conflicts that led to the uprisings. 
The analysis of Iran will act as an outlier this study since it is not an Arab state, has not 
had a revolution since 1979, and further remained destitute to colonial power. However, 
                                                        
24 Zakaria, F.. "How Democracy Can Work in the Middle East." February 13, 2011. 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2046038,00.html (accessed February 21, 2012). 
25 Crabtree, S. "Lieberman: Iraq war was initial spark for Arab Spring." Washington Times. December 19, 
2011. http://www.washingtontimes.com (accessed May 5, 2012). 
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the pre-existing conditions remain prevalent in the Iranian society. In analyzing the pre-
existing conditions, there will be a brief examination of the country’s histories and the 
year leading up to the uprisings. The recommendations follow with predictions on what is 
next for the countries and implications that suggest potential uprisings in the future. The 
conclusion summarizing the findings in this research and conclude that the Arab Spring 
occurred for reasons beyond the conventional wisdom such as the pre-existing conditions.  
U.S.-led Intervention in Iraq 
 The Bush Administration’s justification for intervening in Iraq has faced major 
criticism over the years due to the instability of Iraq and the effects of the war that were 
felt in the U.S. Former president George W. Bush, expressed his reason of the 
intervention at the American Enterprise Institute’s Annual dinner on February 23, 2003. 
Bush declared Iraqas a threat to international security because of the violations of 
numerous United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions by continuing to develop 
nuclear weaponry.26 In order to eliminate this threat, the Bush Administration specifically 
felt the need to remove the long-standing dictator, Saddam Hussein from the country.27By 
removing Hussein from the country, the Bush Administration believed that was the first 
measure in freeing the Iraqi people. Once the U.S. ousted Hussein, a new transitional 
government was implemented to promote democracy and ensure freedom for the Iraqis.28 
The Bush Administrations vision was for Iraq to become the first model of democracy in 
                                                        
26 American Enterprise Institute. "President George W. Bush Speaks at American Enterprise Institute's 
Annual Dinner." Speech, Washington, 2003. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
 22  
the Middle East and other countries in the Arab world would want to follow suit.29 The 
theory behind this vision was Bush’s democracy domino theory.30 
 Bush’s democracy domino theory not only asserted that other countries would 
want democracy as well but, the ideal was a free Iraqi democracy would result in an 
overflow of democratic revolutions in the Middle East. The development of the Iraqi 
democracy by the U.S. would result in a falling domino effect to “democratize the Middle 
East.”31The ideology underlying domino theory is that the political transformation in one 
country will in turn spread and promote change in neighboring countries. The domino 
theory analyzed in the literature review supported the series of massive protests that 
sparked the revolutions in the neighboring countries of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Bush’s 
goal in the democracy domino theory was explained as, 
“A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of 
freedom for other nations in the region. A free Iraq can be a source of hope for all 
the Middle East.”32 
Bush’s ideology was endorsed and supported by former Vice President, Dick Cheney, 
former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Senator Joseph Lieberman of 
Connecticut.33 Cheney appeared on Fox News in August of 2011 and was asked if the 
Arab Spring is a direct result of the U.S. presence in Iraq, he adamantly said the events in 
the Arab world are a result of U.S. bringing democracy to Iraq.34 During an interview 
with USA Today in October of 2011, Rice said the ousting of repressive governments in 
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the Arab Spring stemmed from Bush’s “freedom agenda,” to promote democracy in the 
Middle East.35 Senator Lieberman told reporters in December of 2011, he believed the 
U.S. ability to remove Saddam Hussein from power in 2003, led to the uprisings in the 
Arab Spring because it showed that dictators could be overthrown.36 
 The weakness in Bush’s democratic domino theory lies in the inability of the 
theory to acknowledge the reverse outcome of the domino effect. The ideology behind 
the theory anticipates that an increase in one countries democracy will result in an 
increase in neighboring countries democracies.37 Further the outcome is an increased set 
of democracies in the world. However, if democracy decreases in one country, then the 
democracy in the neighboring countries may decreases as well, which results in an 
overall downturn in global democracy.38While the deterioration of global democracy may 
be a radical critique to the democratic domino theory, the impact of the theory has been 
marginal with regards to the Middle East.  In support of this critique, there was a study 
conducted that analyzed democratic changes in “130 countries for the century and a half 
between 1850 and 2000.”39 The results indicated only about 11% of neighboring 
countries changes in democracy were witnessed.40 Further out the 130 countries, 
democratic changes implemented by foreign military intervention had an even less 
significant impact on democracy in the neighboring countries. The results are further 
justified in the case of Iraq’s neighbors Syria, Lebanon, and others. The crisis in Syria 
witnessed later in the Arab Spring proved the Iraqi democracy implemented by the U.S. 
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did nothing in promoting and or spreading democracy for the region. The historical Baath 
governing party has violently suppressed religious conflicts and regional opposition. 
During the Arab Spring on 2011 and 2012, the government employed violent attacks 
using military tanks, massive arrests and gunfire to contain the protests inspired by 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.41The U.S. hesitation militarily intervening in Syria was backed 
partially by the lessons learned from Iraq, the amount of instability in the region, and the 
Israeli conflict that would arise. Therefore, the reverse outcome of Bush’s democratic 
domino theory provides more impact on foreign policy implications than the impact on a 
democratized Middle East. 
 The next factor in the U.S. promotion of democracy in Iraq resulting in the events 
of the Arab Spring is linked to the time difference. In 2003, the U.S. intervened in Iraq, in 
2009 there were massive protests because of the elections turnout in Iran, and in 2010 the 
uprisings in Tunisia occurred. David Phillips, Director of the program on Peace-Building 
and Rights at Columbia University Institute for the Study of Human Rights, in 
“America’s role the Arab Spring” describes how Bush believed his theory would be 
proven by the future events in the Middle East.42 However, Phillips argues Bush’s theory 
has not held up because of the renewed violent situation almost a decade after the U.S. 
intervention in Iraq.43 The transitional government after Saddam Hussein ignited more 
violence and continued the instability in the area.44 
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In Rashid Khalidi’s article called “The Arab Spring,” he mentions there have been 
patterns in the Arab world that reveal deeper internal problems plagued by foreign 
intervention, which cannot be solved right away with democracy.45Khalidi’s assessment 
does not present the case for a better type of government, instead he analyzes a history of 
foreign intervention both European and Western to explain the how democracy is not the 
sole solution for the Arab Spring.46 The U.S. intervention in Iraq is an example of 
Khalidi’s sentiment. According to a U.S. report on Iraq in September of 2002, Saddam 
Hussein violated UN resolutions about nuclear weapons, human abuses, and economic 
sanctions from the early 1990s to the U.S. intervention in 2003.47 For example, one of the 
agreements under the UN Security Council Resolution 1284 called for Iraq to deliver 
medical supplies and humanitarian goods to Iraqis in need without discrimination.48 On 
the contrary, Iraq used UN funded humanitarian trucks for military and construction 
purposes to build facilities for nuclear weapons.49 Therefore, Saddam Hussein’s reign in 
Iraq posed a threat to international security decades prior to the U.S. intervention. 
Bush’s democracy domino theory underestimates the ability of Middles 
Easterners and further presents a limited justification for the uprisings. Phillips argues in 
his article that Middle Easterners denounce the claims of U.S. politician’s Iraqi 
democracy in any way acted as motivation for them to act on their sovereignty in the 
uprisings of the Arab Spring.50 The Zogby Research Services conducted polling surveys 
in multiples countries of the MENA about the Arab Spring, other developments in the 
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region, and U.S. troop’s withdrawal from Iraq.51When the survey asked who benefited 
more from the war, 39 percent of Iraqis and a significant number of Jordanians believed 
the U.S. received the most benefit.52 Amongst all the findings of the survey, James Zogby 
explained the different results in attitudes of U.S. intervention in Iraq between Shias and 
Sunnis by stating: 
 “42 percent of the Iraqi people felt that the war had left them worse off, but 60 
percent of the Kurdish population felt the American intervention had left them 
better off. Similarly, Kurds believed that the United States has had a largely 
positive effect on Iraqi safety and security, while Shias noted only a slightly 
positive impact, and Sunnis viewed the effect as negative overall.”53 
 Zogby findings provide support for the pre-existing condition of religious and 
ethnic conflicts based on the differentiating responses from the Shias, Sunnis and the 
Kurds. Further Zogby views Tunisia as a better example of democracy than Iraq.54Fouad 
Ajami, former director of the Middle East Studies program at The John Hopkins 
University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), wrote article entitled “Five 
Myths of the Arab Spring.”55 Out of the five myths Ajami denounced the conventional 
wisdom of the U.S. led intervention in Iraq has led to the Arab Spring because Saddam 
Hussein was forced out by the U.S. and as a result the Shiite majority consumed power.56 
The Arab Spring is a result of uprisings by the people and Saddam Hussein led the Shiite 
majority while he held power.57 Therefore, there was no change to the political culture 
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and the religious and ethnic conflicts between the Shiites and Sunnis increased with U.S. 
presence in Iraq. Based on the evidence presented the study of the Arab Spring must be 
continued to determine additional factors beyond the U.S. intervention in Iraq that may 
have caused the Arab Spring.  
Tunisia 
In 1856, Tunisia gained its independence from French colonial rule. Since then 
the country had only two leaders Habib Bourguiba (1968-1987) and Zine al-Abidine Ben 
Ali (1987-2011).58Bourguiba was deemed “Supreme Warrior,” after leading Tunisia’s 
fight for independence from France in 1955.59As president, Bourguiba platform aimed to 
promote modernization through political, social, and economic reforms.60 Under his 
leadership, emancipation was granted for women, free education was implemented, and 
polygamy was abolished.61 However overtime during his rule, Tunisia’s economy 
struggled severely which contributed to the political controversy in the region.62 
After declaring Bourguiba unfit to rule due to his sickness, Zine al-Abdine Ben 
Ali became president on November 7, 1987, using the constitution to justify his 
authority.63 Ben Ali’s beginning platform presented a focus to achieve democracy in 
Tunisia. In his early years as president, he received accolades for extending political and 
civil rights, which increased his legitimacy.64 However, overtime, Ben Ali’s rule was 
geared more towards creating a police state that exercised complete censorship over 
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Tunisians. The political oppression felt by Tunisians started with the restrictions on 
freedom of speech, press, and the inefficiency in the rule of law.65 Ben Ali exercised 
censorship on new publications, shut down Internet access and banned websites from 
opposition groups.66The Tunisian constitution declared the freedoms and civil rights as 
guaranteed by the law; therefore, Ben Ali, imposed laws and regulations to an extent 
without having to amend the constitution to exercise control.  
Ben Ali’s reforms were also proven to be in violation of Tunisia’s international 
human rights obligations.67 Article 1 and 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, ensures the protection of economic, social and cultural rights 
including: the right to self-determination of all peoples and the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living.68 As of 2005 the Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact 
book, the percentage of unemployed youths from 15 to 24 was 31.4 percent males and 
29.3 percent females.69 In the Southwest region Gafsa, people faced poverty, poor living 
conditions, and unsafe drinking water due to the pollution by the phosphate industry.70 
While the issues surrounding poverty were a major problem throughout Tunisia, social 
unrest from religious and ethnic conflicts plagued society.  
 Arabs and Muslims occupy the majority ethnic and religious groups, while Jews 
and Christians represent the minority in Tunisia.71 From the early rulings of Bourguiba, 
there were a series of initiatives to reform religious law, practice, and family life.72 
Bourguiba launched campaigns and repression against Islam. Ben Ali continued the 
                                                        
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid, "Micromobilization, Social Media, and Coping Strategies: Some Dutch Experiences." 
67 Ibid, Behind Tunisia's 'Economic Miracle': Inequality and Criminalization of Protest." 
68 Ibid, "Micromobilization, Social Media, and Coping Strategies: Some Dutch Experiences." 
69 —. Tunisia. April 2012. http://www.cia.gov (accessed May 3, 2012). 
70 Ibid, Behind Tunisia's 'Economic Miracle': Inequality and Criminalization of Protest." 
71 Ibid, Tunisia. 
72 Ibid, Tunisia The Politics of Modernization. 
 29  
sentiment of his predecessor by repressing Islam and promoting his secularist views as 
superior. Reports indicate Tunisians were not allowed to wear religious dressings in 
public places.73 In addition, Muslim worshippers were allotted a set amount of time for 
prayer, while other opposition political groups were banned.74 The tactics implemented 
by Tunisian dictators was in attempt to suppress the practice of Islam and further subdue 
any religious opposition. However, the efforts that were once viewed as instituting 
secularism had little to no impact on reforming the Islamic culture in society. The result 
of such tactics increased the growing opposition of the regimes. 
The Tunisian government faced an ongoing struggle to provide equal 
opportunities, increasing marginalization, and regional inequalities. Furthermore, the 
political oppression, poverty, religious and ethnic conflicts throughout Tunisia’s history 
was indication for potential instability in the future. In December of 2010, Mohamed 
Bouazizi, a fruit vendor, set himself on fire in front of a government building after being 
beaten by police and prohibited to sell his goods.75 The news of Bouazizi outraged 
Tunisians and sparked the beginnings of massive protests. By January of 2011, unable to 
control the explosive protests, Ben Ali and his family fled to Saudi Arabia and denounced 
his presidency of twenty-three years.76 The Tunisian government did not waste any time 
implementing an interim government, legalizing political parties and planning elections 
all within the same year. These proactive measures, led by Prime Minister Ghannouchi, 
were implemented in hopes of satisfying the angry protesters. Ben Ali’s Rally for 
Constitutional Democracy (RCD) party was eradicated by a court order and the countries 
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first democratic elections were set to happen in October of 2011. The purpose of the 
elections was to elect new members into parliament that would become part of the 
National Constituent Assembly, who would be responsible for drafting the new 
constitution.77 The election resulted in the Ennahda Islamist party winning more than half 
of the seats in parliament. By December of 2011 a new president, Moncef Marzouki, was 
elected and the leader of the Ennahda party, Hamadi Jebali, was affirmed as Prime 
Minister.   
Egypt 
Between January and February of 2011, the uprisings in Tunisia influenced 
Egyptians to charge to Tahrir Square and demand that then President Hosni Mubarak step 
down from power.78Mubarak ruled in Egypt from October of 1981 until February of 
2011, when he resigned from presidency. 79Answar Sadat, Mubarak’s predecessor, was 
assassinated on October 14, 1981.80 Critics of the Sadat’s regime believed the country 
looked outside its borders for solicitation on its own social an economic organization.81 
Throughout the history of Egypt, there are deeply rooted problems of corruption and 
elitism. According to the World’s Fact book 2005 estimate, 20 percent of Egyptians lived 
below the poverty line.82 While in 2007 an estimated 17.2 percent males and 47.9 percent 
females were unemployed youths between the ages of 15 to 24.83 For more than 30 years 
Mubarak, under a quasi-military rule, implemented what was known as an “emergency 
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law.”84 Under the emergency law the state has the immediate power to arrest or restrict 
fundamental freedoms of Egyptians at any time.85 Mubarak repressed the freedom of 
speech for Egyptian newspapers, journalist, and or any opposition published about his 
regime.86 The political oppression of Mubarak was backed by a corrupt electoral system, 
where the National Democratic Party (NDP) held the majority.87 
 Another issue in Egypt was the religious and ethnic conflicts. The Egyptian 
majority is comprised of mostly Sunni Muslims, while Coptic Christians represent the 
minority.88Egypt’s Sunni Muslim occupies approximately 90%, while Christians 
consisting of Coptic, Orthodox, and Anglican represent only about10% of the 
population.89The constitution of Egypt established Islam as the state religion, but 
mentions individuals may exercise freedom of religious practices. However, Egyptians 
did not have the full freedom to practice as the constitution states. For example, Muslims 
and Christian were not allowed to convert to the other faith and the Mubarak regime 
maintained an intense Islamic rule over all Egyptians.90 Amnesty International reported 
the regime even denied construction and repairs to Christian churches.91Mubarak’s 
mistreatment of Christians made them more susceptible to targeted violent attacks from 
Islamist extremist groups.92 In May of 2011, several thousand Muslims from a well-
known extremist group, tried to break into St. Mena Church, looking for a woman 
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accused of converting from Christianity to Islam.93 The division Mubarak created was 
deeply rooted throughout his reign; therefore, the religious and ethnic conflicts have 
continued even after the revolution. 
Libya 
Muammar el-Qaddafi led the Free Unionist Officers, in overthrowing the 
monarchy held by King Idris, and seized power on September 1, 1969.94 Qaddafi 
declared Libya a free self-governing republic in his speech shortly after taking power: 
“She will advance on the road to freedom, the path of unity and social justice, 
guarantying equality to all her citizens…honest employment, where injustice and 
exploitation are banished, where no one will count himself master and servant, 
and where all will be free, brothers within a society in which, with God’s help, 
prosperity and equality will be seen to rule us all.”95 
The context of his speech was positive, yet Qaddafi’s reforms would prove to be quite 
opposite. Under Qaddafi’s orders, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) 
implemented bans on the consumption of alcohol, publications of public entertainment, 
and or anything they considered to be vulgar.96 The approach of the regime to promote 
unity was through the practices of Islam.97 The early socioeconomic reforms aimed to 
redistribute wealth, increase education, and address gender equalities.98 However, the 
radical reforms had a direct negative effect on Qaddafi’s development goals. One of his 
earliest reforms that led to early opposition groups was the decision to eliminate the 
                                                        
93 Kirkpatrick, D. "Egypt's Christian Fear Violence as Changes Embolden Islamists." The New York Times. 
May 30, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com (accessed May 3, 2012). 
94 Simons, Geoff. Libya: The Struggle for Survival. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 




 33  
private sector, which stopped real estate development, and heavily impacted the middle 
class.99 
 By the mid-1970s, Qaddafi began to question the religious elites because they 
were the center of Islam. Overtime, he destroyed the power base, which was the religious 
elites, challenged Islamic legal institutions, and suspended laws that he felt would hinder 
the socioeconomic reforms. The practice of private law was outlawed, which turned all 
lawyers into state employees, and the court system was changed into a parallel system 
that diminished the right to appeal.100 This set of reforms marked a long period with a 
repressive justice system, which led to the heightened tensions in the 1990s. As the 
opposition groups developed at an alarming rate, Qaddafi began to inflict harsher tactics 
to suppress the groups. 
 Libyans were forced to live by Qaddafi’s infamous Green Book that was a 
composition of his deals on how politics, economics and society should be governed. The 
Green Book was based on principles of Socialism, Islam and Arabism that essentially led 
to his demise.101  Qaddafi viewed himself as a higher being destined to not only rule 
Libya but also a much greater purpose. This personality trait was intertwined with how 
Qaddafi governed Libya. The first volume of the Green Book titled, “The Solution the 
Problem of Democracy,” declared the most plausible form of democracy is one in which 
the masses align themselves in popular congresses, peoples committees and professional 
associations.102 In turn, Qaddafi stepped down from all official positions and declared 
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himself the “Guide to the Era of the Masses.”103 Qaddafi implemented these reforms to 
demonstrate his pursuit of democracy based on the Green Book. While Qaddafi resigned 
from the actual positions, he maintained control over the people committees and popular 
congresses concerning when they held meetings and further what they even discussed. 
The irony of Qaddafi’s Green Book democratic reforms was in that they did nothing to 
secure democracy for Libyans; instead, the reforms only strengthened to his centralized 
power. In addition it is important to note that Qaddafi was known as the longest reigning 
dictator of the Arab world prior to his death. Qaddafi did so by eliminating political 
competition and further removing any opposition to the regime.  
 The second volume of the Green Book known as “The Solution of the Economic 
Problem,” was a mixture of socialist and capitalist economic ideals.104 Qaddafi kept 
Libya’s oil-rich economy tightly sealed from foreign influence and even Libyans. During 
his reign there were economic reforms, but they failed to reach the masses. The Libya 
elites benefited from the economic reforms, but Qaddafi’s children really reaped the 
benefits of Libyans economy.105 Libya did receive foreign investments in energy, Tripoli 
began to exhibit an upcoming metropolitan city; however, poverty remained very high. 
 Qaddafi’s reforms exhibited a trend to develop a centralized power. Further 
Qaddafi’s family members held control over the political and economic systems of Libya. 
In addition, Libyans never felt the freedom of speech, press, or religious practice, as 
Qaddafi promised in the beginning of his regime.106 The countries heavily dependent oil 
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economy led to increased periods of unemployment.107 Qaddafi employed foreign 
workers, contractors, and technicians for the oil industry.108 In 2005, 13 percent of 
Libyans were unemployed in the local population of approximately 5.5 million and half 
of that percentage was under the age of 20.109 
 In February of 2011, Libyans had finally had enough of the Qaddafi regime, and 
massive protests broke out aimed to remove Qaddafi from power. Qaddafi’s military 
fought hard to repress the rebels but as time went on the rebels appeared in Tripoli more 
violent. With the massive battle between the military and the rebels, headlines spread 
throughout the international news of the growing number of civilian causalities. The UN 
Security Council approved a resolution to allow the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) air strikes in Libya, to improve civilian protection. In October of 2011 news 
headlines, reported Qaddafi and his eldest son were pronounced dead after reportedly 
trying to flee during an NATO air strike.110 
Iran 
The case of Iran presents an outlier to the other countries presented in this 
research because despite the massive protests over the election turnout in 2009, the 
Iranians have not had a since 1979. The massive protests in June of 2009 were the 
reaction of outraged Iranians after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was victorious in 
another election.111Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei immediately 
responded to the people in launching an investigation of the election; however, he later 
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reported there were no indications of any corrupt activities.112President Ahmadinejad 
ordered police to brutality suppress the opposition movements and increased the security 
forces. The massive protest continued through 2009 and revealed other issues within the 
Iranian governance.  
 According to the Department of State Report in 2008, there was legal and societal 
discrimination against women, ethnic and religious minorities.113 The Shia occupies the 
majority of Iranians and the minority groups include Baha’i, Christian, Zoroastrian, Sunni 
Muslim, and Jewish communities.114 The non-Muslim religious minorities have reported 
imprisonment, harassment, and intimidation based on their religious beliefs.115 President 
Ahmadinejad has implemented formal sanctions of discrimination, in the areas of 
employment, education, and housing. The repression is currently hindering Iranians from 
overthrowing their government because Ahmadinejad security forces have been able to 
contain the protests since June 2009. The Iranians are still facing political oppression, 
repression, dealing with religious and ethnic conflicts while battling poverty all at once. 
According to the International Monetary Fund, Iran’s labor force is experiencing the 
highest brain drain in the Middle East because hundreds of thousands skilled and 
educated Iranians leave the country every year to find jobs in the U.S. and Europe 
because of President Ahmadinejad oppressive regime.116However, just as the other 
countries in the Arab Spring, the Iranian government will be forced to implement 
infrastructure changes beyond the removal of Ahmadinejad. With the reports of nuclear 
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developments and human rights abuses, the Iranian government will be faced with too 
many sanctions and minimal international financial assistance. Unfortunately, the Iranian 
government does not appear willing to implement democratic reforms for the people; 
instead, the government is more focused on establishes its presence as a nuclear power.  
Recommendations and a look ahead 
After researching the protests and revolutions in the Arab Spring, the first 
recommendation for Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya is to establish social stability. The 
transitional governments should be compromised of leaders from varying opposition 
groups willing to collaborate and promote initiatives to establish unity. As discussed in 
this research, protests continued after the former dictators left power in all three 
countries. Therefore, the transitional governments must establish reformations that will 
satisfy the people, in order to gain political legitimacy. Further it is imperative for all of 
the countries to develop internal solutions for their problems and present those needs to 
foreign actors such as the U.S. The goal is to allow the country’s to present their needs 
versus having foreign involvement in every aspect of the transitional governments such 
as in Iraq. Countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya should have goal-oriented 
deadlines. The date of elections, installation of officers, and budgets for upcoming fiscal 
years should be strategically planned.  There is a need to get all of the countries on the 
same progression rate to promote the spread of democracy in the MENA. In turn, there 
will be an increase in neighboring partnerships to deter unwanted foreign involvement.  
Skilled workers that have fled these countries over the last three years due to 
violence need to have incentives to go back to their home countries. After such high 
protests, there is a need to stabilize society to allow for economic growth. In order to 
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increase citizen participation, there can be grant opportunities every six months for non-
government organizations (NGOs) that are building awareness and advocating for 
participation. This will give smaller NGOs a chance to make an impact on their society. 
The process of democratization will not be overnight for any of the countries. In order for 
any democratic reforms to sustainable, they will have to be developed by each country 
based on their particular needs. The countries of the Arab Spring will have to develop a 
proper infrastructure and construct their own way of democracy.  
Conclusion 
Bush’s democracy domino theory asserted that as a result of America’s military 
occupation, an increase in democracy for one country, in turn would result in an increase 
of democracy for the neighboring countries. Further this would overall spread democracy 
for the Middle East.117 Despite the conventional wisdom presented, the pre-conditions of 
political oppression, poverty, religious and ethnic conflicts are reasons for the uprisings 
beyond the U.S. presence in Iraq. The critics of the Arab Spring claim the U.S. 
intervention in Iraq is the direct effect for the uprisings are conservative Bush Supporters 
such as Rice, Cheney, and Lieberman. The protesters in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Iran 
voiced the years of struggle under their former regime as political oppression, poverty, 
religious and ethnic conflicts. In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the dictators all campaigned 
on a platform for democracy to legitimize their power and gather support. However, 
overtime each dictator began to implement reforms to centralize the power of the state, 
deter economic opportunities in favor of elites, eliminate political opposition and further 
manipulate the fundamental rights and freedoms of their people. The U.S. intervention in 
Iraq may have encouraged the spirit of protest in the citizens of the Arab Spring; 
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however, the uprisings of the Arab Spring were a direct result of the people taking back 
their sovereignty. As the countries reach the end of 2011, it will be interesting to see the 
progress of democracy throughout the Arab Spring. Since Tunisia was the first 
revolution, will the country be the first to establish a Muslim democracy? The initiation 
of democratic transitions in Arab Spring will fuel and test the current debate on 
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CAN ISLAM AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY COEXIST? 
A CASE STUDY OF TUNISIA, EGYPY AND TURKEY 
 
Introduction 
The peak of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt is now over as the former 
authoritarian leaders have left the countries and transitional governments have been 
implemented in pursuit of democracy. The onset of the democratic transitions has been 
troubling for both countries. While the authoritarian leaders are no longer present in 
Tunisia and Egypt, the fear of Islamic regimes remerging remains. Historically, Islamic 
countries in the region have been characterized by authoritarian rule, leaving many to 
question whether Islam and democracy are even compatible.118Despite the conventional 
Islam and democracy are compatible; however, the marginal presence of Muslim 
democracies is due to the internal and external factors of political Islam, power, and past 
and present foreign intervention. Further the question of compatibility lies between 
challenges of Islam and liberal democracy. Today, the Muslim democracies of Turkey, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Bangladesh, indicate the possibility of Islam and democracy 
coexisting, yet why are there not more Muslim democracies.119In addition to what factors 
have contributed to the inability of Islamic countries to establish and sustain democracy? 
Turkey has been widely disputed as the most comparable non-Arab model for 
countries of the Arab Spring based on its geographic location, history, and current 
democracy.120 In Turkey, the process of democratization involved centuries of strict 
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military rule and violent tactics to ensure secularism.121 Turkey has faced claims of 
discrimination, terrorism and repression against religious minorities and Muslims 
throughout its history. Currently, the country is pursuing more democratic reforms and 
human rights initiatives, as it goes through the process of accession to the European 
Union (EU).  However, the Turkish military has played a significant role in implementing 
secularism and further suppressing religious extremists. Therefore, the discussion of 
current politics in Turkey present implications on what is necessary to sustain a Muslim 
democracy.  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the internal and external factors of 
political Islam, power, and past and present foreign intervention to determine why 
Islamic countries have struggled in establishing and further sustaining democracies. The 
factors of past and present foreign intervention revolve around European colonization and 
the United States (U.S.) promotion of liberal democracy. The theories Islam, liberal 
democracy and liberal autocracy are examined too establish a theoretical framework. The 
theory of Islam is discussed through universally accepted principles of the religion versus 
its implications as an ideology, known as political Islam. Next, the analysis of liberal 
democracy reveals the initial conflicts that arise for Islamic countries in pursuing 
democracy. The theory of liberal autocracy presents examples of how and why previous 
democratic reforms by authoritarian leaders have not been sustainable. The theory of 
liberal autocracy is directly related to the former authoritarian regimes in Egypt and 
Tunisia. The discussion of former authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Tunisia reveal the 
challenges both countries will have to overcome in their democratic transitions. The final 
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section of this chapter examines the Turkish democracy to determine how the factors of 
secularism and modernization have contributed to its sustainability and if they can be 
employed in Egypt and Tunisia. In doing so, this research will conclude with factors from 
Turkey that can act recommendations for both Egypt and Tunisia in their democratic 
transitions.  
Islam vs. Political Islam 
Islam is a monotheistic religion founded upon the belief of one God, Allah, who 
sent prophets down to earth to teach people how to live. The seal of the prophets is 
Muhammad. Islam is practiced through five pillars: belief, worship, fasting, almsgiving, 
and pilgrimage.122 The foundations of faith in Islam are based on Allah’s revelations to 
Muhammad, which are revealed in the Quran, along with the reports on Muhammad’s 
life, known as the Traditions or hadith.123 The Traditions were not written down in the 
beginning and once Muhammad passed, his followers were eager to compile all the 
stories.124The Sunna or custom of the Prophet is the founding of Islamic jurisprudence 
under the Quran.125The sharia, a combination of the Sunna and Quran, is a set of rules 
that govern a Muslim society. The complexity of Islam throughout history is due to the 
evolving interpretations, imperialism, and Islamic leaders. The general understanding of 
Islamists constantly circumstantial and developing, which is only one factor among 
others that affect the possibilities for liberalization and democratization.126 
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The debate over the compatibility of Islam and Democracy stems from critics 
predicting the consequences of political Islam resurfacing based on the last two decades 
of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world.127Political Islam can be traced back to the 19th 
century as a form of resistance from the controlling European powers in relation to 
culture and economics.128In a general context, political Islam is the belief that Islam 
presents important claims on how politics and society should be governed; therefore, 
should be infused in the contemporary Arab world.129 However, more specifically 
political Islam is a systemic tool used by groups, individuals, and organizations in pursuit 
of their own political interests. Greg Barton, author of “Jemah Islamiyah: Radical 
Islamism in Indonesia,” describes the two sides of political Islam as:  
“At one extreme are those who would merely like to see Islam accorded proper 
recognition in national life in terms of national symbols. At the other extreme are 
those who want to see the radical transformation of society and politics, by 
whatever means, into an absolute theocracy.”130 
The actions pursued on either side of political Islam are dependent on the context of the 
individual, group, and or organization political objectives. The regimes of the Arab 
Spring had a history of suppressing Islamic organizations political activities by denying 
them the right to legal party status. As a result, some Islamic organizations became 
violent and others remained apolitical until they were able to obtain legal party status.  
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The impact and actions of Islamic groups vary in different countries. The 
manifestations of political Islam are linked to interpretations of religious precepts, local 
and political cultures. However, Islam has a negative connotation because of the 
extremist transnational organizations such as al-Qaeda that act politically dramatic in the 
name of Islam, through terrorist activities, which dates back to the origin of Islam.131 
These actions overshadow daily positive political activity in the Arab world. The 
mainstream Islamist movements operate within national boundaries peacefully to 
influence society and politics through constitutional means. Further, the Arab world has 
witnessed Islamic movements that promoted democracy. The trajectory and or future of 
political Islam are somewhat dependent on international actors, particularly the U.S. 
involvement in Muslim countries. Islam becomes salient when it is filtered through local 
conditions and interacts with international actors in a way that augment trends that exist 
because of domestic factors.132The U.S. relationship with several authoritarian regimes in 
the Muslim world reveals American policies to be hostile to Muslim interests and broadly 
defined.133 
 Political and religious identities often interrelate, thus making religious affiliation 
a form of political identity.134Authoritarian leaders implemented religious sanctioned 
titles and institutions as a way to legitimize their own rule. This practice only intensified 
the separation between Muslims and allowed political Islam to flourish like an opposition 
ideology under autocratic rule.135 The history and even current position of the religion-
state relations in Islam is plagued by the states domination over the instrumental use of 
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religion. As a result, there is a myth that in which Islamists have contributed to a great 
deal by referencing the sharia in the context of an Islamic state as if the two go 
together.136This is considered a myth because not Muslim countries, particularly in the 
Arab Spring ruled directly from the sharia in present day such as the Tunisian 
government. A myth such as the one above place religion at the forefront of politics for 
Muslim societies and is the reason for their resistant to accepting any democratic reforms. 
However, the challenge of validating this myth is the lack of consistency from former 
authoritarian leaders reacting to foreign pressures to implement democratic reforms.137 In 
order to further analyze this issue, it is imperative to analyze liberal democracy and how 
it has been implemented in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia.  
Liberal Democracy  
Liberal democracies are political systems that ensure equal liberties, rights, and 
freedoms along with the attributes of equal participation, legitimacy, and political 
competition.138 Liberalism is defined as collection of beliefs that advocates for 
government action to improve social welfare, ensure civil rights and social liberties, and 
equal opportunity. Further liberalism involves an advocacy for the redistribution of 
wealth for improvements of welfare for social classes. Therefore, liberal democracy 
entails protecting liberties, freedoms, and rights for all people through democratic means. 
Democracy is defined as a system of government which political authority rest in the 
hands of the people through popular sovereignty. The people elect officials to make 
decisions on their behalf. Within a democracy there are principles of universal suffrage or 
the right for all to vote. In a democracy elections are free, fair, multi-party, and encourage 
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a high level of political competition. Further the elections are conducted based on the 
majority rule principle and or open with the freedom of press and speech.  
All of these characteristics are essentially make the political culture associated 
with the U.S. representative democracy. In such as system there is limited government, 
authority and legitimacy, which are secured in the U.S.  The Constitution has outlined 
guaranteed rights and freedoms, responsibilities of government infrastructures and 
limitations on power. The fundamental principles of the constitution are popular 
sovereignty, elected officials by the people, limited government, separation of powers or 
check and balances, and a system with a separation between state and federal rule.  
The liberal democracy witnessed in the U.S. is two-fold with secularism and 
pluralism. Secularism or the separation between church and state asserts, “that people of 
different religions and beliefs are equal before law.”139  Pluralism is a condition in which 
different religions and beliefs are accepted in society. Therefore secular pluralism is 
defined as “systems which is not under the control of any religion or singular belief, nor 
does it give primacy to any religion.”140 Islamic traditionalist immediately rejects the 
notion of secularism pluralism. The sharia or Islamic law dictates how society should be 
governed, what laws are to be enacted, and further places Islam above all other 
religions.141 This perspective views majority of Western ideals and institutions as threat 
to Islamic law and culture. Islamist has capitalized on the various political and economic 
systems that have proven to be unable to solve society’s problems. Further even in 
present day, Islamist traditionalist continues their plea for Islamic resurgence. The 
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Islamist traditionalist has also employed extremist and terrorist attacks in the name of 
Islam. Throughout Islamic history and even in present day, Muslims have been able to 
live peacefully amongst religious minorities with the exception of violent conflicts that 
act as those exceptions are typically brought on by political issues. 
The traditionalist view of Islam is will never cease to exist; instead, the challenge 
lies in removing this view from politics. In addition to the promotion of liberal 
democracy in the Middle East being conscious of the underlying Islamic culture.  Only a 
few days after former president of Tunisia Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s resignation, then 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton encouraged a quick turnaround for democratic 
elections. Clinton stated, “We look to the Tunisian government to build a stronger 
foundation for Tunisia’s future with economic, social and political reforms.”142 While 
critics may want to broaden the definition of democracy, the type of democracy 
encouraged by the U.S. politicians tends to rely heavily on elections and liberalism. The 
U.S. continues to advocate for democracy in the Arab world, yet their policies and 
intervention lean more towards liberal democracy for the area. As Fareed Zakaria 
describes in “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, “the freedoms that define liberal 
democracy might be constitutionally liberal; however it is theoretically different from 
democracy.143 The history of democracy in the U.S. has been violent, war-torn, and quite 
illiberal. The slave trade was endorsed by Europeans and slavery continued in North 
America for decades.144 Racial segregation and gender discrimination were implemented 
and allowed in the U.S. centuries after the constitution was drafted. The process of 
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establishing a democracy and further inserting liberalism is difficult. Philippe Schmitter, 
a notable political scientist, describes the inconsistency in liberal democracy as:   
“Liberalism, either as a conception of political liberty, or as a doctrine about 
economic policy, may have coincided with the rise of democracy. But it has never 
been immutably or unambiguously linked to its practice.”145 
Liberal democracies in Europe and North America were not seen until approximately 
around the 20th century.  
In recent times, there has been a rise in democracies that are less liberal than the 
U.S.; however, this is a trend that dates back to the 20th century, as well. Freedom House, 
a non-government organization (NGO), conducted a survey to evaluate freedom 
throughout the world by ranking countries on political and civil liberties called Freedom 
in the World. Freedom in the World 2011 concluded with a consecutive decline in free 
countries, decrease in the number of electoral democracies (lowest since 1995), and the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region continued to have the “lowest levels of 
democracy in the world.”146 Based on the Freedom in the World 2011 report, democratic 
elections are not guarantying freedom or democracy, which reveal a lack of sustainability 
for democracy. The lack of sustainability could be a result of pressure from the U.S. and 
Europe to democratize, yet there policies towards this region has not changed 
significantly enough to rise to the challenge of democracy. Arch Puddington, Director of 
research at Freedom House, pointed out, “If the world’s democracies fail to unite and 
speak out in defense of their own value, despots will continue to gain momentum.”147 
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While Puddington’s point is valid, the response and encouragement of the U.S. has not 
been well received on the MENA front. However, given the history of the U.S. relations 
throughout the Muslim world, the U.S. must change its approach in seeking to promote 
liberal democracy in the countries of the Arab Spring and further the Middle East.  
Democracy creates political space for minority and or opposition groups that 
usually would not have a political platform to influence voters or campaign. Even when 
practiced imperfectly, democracy can create political room for extremist and non-
extremist Islamic parties.148 Democracy shows many faces of political Islam within each 
country of the Arab Spring.149Throughout history, the promotion of liberal democracy by 
the U.S. has resulted in inconsistent democratic reforms implemented by authoritarian 
leasers.  
Liberal Autocracy 
 Liberal autocracy is described as a response to U.S. democratic pressures to 
implement temporary democratic reforms in the name of ensuring religious rights and 
freedoms.150 In the Arab world, this was seen through temporary lifts on media sanctions 
when facing accusations of social injustices from the international community. However, 
once the pressures died down the authoritarian laws remained intact and allowed the 
governments to continue their control. Liberal autocracy essentially aids in the 
government’s ability to survive and indirectly control political life. Egypt’s former 
government under Hosni Mubarak was considered a liberal autocracy.151 Mubarak’s 
liberal reforms in response to U.S. pressure to democratize led to an unbalanced economy 
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that sought to maximize the gains of the ruling elite, which eventually increased poverty 
in Egypt.152Between November and December of 2005, Mubarak permitted the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) to campaign more openly in the parliamentary elections.153 However, 
the MB was never granted legal party status. This was a tactic to show Mubarak’s 
willingness to increase political competition and further Egypt’s steps towards 
democratization. Mubarak’s regime in Egypt was one of the most relevant examples of 
liberal autocracy. 
 Ben Ali’s reign in Tunisia is another example of liberal autocracy. In the 
beginning Ben Ali’s regime promoted civil liberties, human rights, and freedom of 
speech. However, these liberal practices were put to an end leading into the election year 
of 1989. Ben Ali prohibited Islamist parties from running in the elections and rejected 
any electoral reforms that would all “secular opposition parties “to run in the elections.154 
Ben Ali introduced reforms using electoral codes that were merely his way of 
implementing rules to limit opposition and stopping parties from gaining an effective 
presence.155 This practice continued through Ben Ali’s reign. By the 1990s, the Islamist 
parties were believed to have accomplished every measure required by law to gain legal 
party status; however, Ben Ali continued to deny them of this status.156As a result, there 
was a large bloody protest, which resulted in thousands of Islamists jailed. This bloody 
conflict led to Ben Ali’s government implementing even tighter controls and soon 
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removing any freedom of speech that existed. Ben Ali instructed his police force to 
punish any opposition activity that showed support for the Islamists. Media outlets that 
voiced opposition to the government were banned and business licenses could be revoked 
if there were uncertainty in the business’s allegiance to the state.157 Ben Ali maintained 
his power through the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party and was able 
to keep the opposition politically silent until the massive protests in the Arab Spring.  
The theory of liberal autocracy also shows how imperialism and foreign 
intervention can have everlasting effects on they country. Adeslam Maghraoui concludes 
in “Liberalism without Democracy,” that liberalisms own cultural implications whether 
Western or European have negatively impacted the Middle East.158 The conventional 
wisdom on the U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East is founded upon their own 
liberal, and secular views being the only way to sustain democracy.159 The U.S., like 
former European imperial powers sees no contradiction in imposing their views on the 
country and liberating those citizens. The advocates of liberal democracy fail to 
acknowledge the “contradiction between liberating the nations and subverting their 
culture and traditions.”160 Maghraoui asserts that despite the different international actors 
the strategy or approach towards the Middle East that the same underlying 
misconception.161The U.S. has been aware of the social injustices and human rights 
abuses within the MENA for decades. At times of chaos and social unrest, such as in the 
Arab Spring, the U.S. has strongly encouraged democratic reforms for the region. 
However, this encouragement is backed by a liberal view of democracy, which may not 
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work for the countries of the Arab Spring. The U.S. must be mindful of their stance on 
promoting democracy to avoid democratic pressures previously felt by authoritarian 
leaders to further promote the longevity of new democratic reforms.   
Egypt  
British colonial rule over Egypt left behind significant implications on Egyptian 
culture. The British controlled the economy, armed forces and government personnel.162 
The armed forces was kept small because the British feared a large military would result 
threaten their rule. Colonial Egypt was once fought over between the French and British 
until a treaty was established on how the region would be divided. The combination of 
both French and British colonization resulted in an Egyptian society infused with 
modernization and secularization.163 However, over time, there was a growing resentment 
towards the colonial rule that resulted in the development of present day Egyptian 
nationalism. In addition to the first Islamic political organization known as the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) was established following the end of World War II. The state that 
followed independence from colonialism was committed to liberalism and 
secularization.164 Upon independence, Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser presented himself as 
a pro-democratic leader for Egypt. 
The case of Egypt shows, successful, and enduring authoritarian regimes maintain 
power through a balanced use of patronage, exclusionary laws, and the coercive 
apparatus of the states.165In addition to a combination of strategies that secure the 
existence of contained pluralism within authoritarian regimes and permit them to adopt 
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images of liberalization and democratization without conceding to such measures.166 The 
balance of power in Egypt between the executive and legislative has always favored the 
executive throughout its history. From Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, Anwar El Sadat, to 
Hosni Mubarak, there has been a continuous promotion of liberalization that evolved into 
a series of oppressive politics. Nasser promoted modernization of the economy through 
the use of a large public sector, bureaucracy, and the mobilization of subordinate classes 
against the landed elites and private business elites.167Sadat's democratization involved 
depoliticizing the military to liberalize the political system. However, his efforts appeared 
to be influenced by economic, political priorities.168 This strategy was reinforced by the 
nature of Law 40 of 1977, governing political parties. According to this law, political 
parties can goals, principles, and programs could conflict with public order, national 
unity, or the sharia.169 
Mubarak portrayed himself as an advocate of democracy with the view that 
democracy was the best thing for Egypt’s future, and he had no intentions of centralizing 
the power of the state.170 However, as time progressed, Mubarak’s stance on democracy 
acted as a tool to legitimize his position and consolidate power. When critics begin to 
question his democratic reforms, Mubarak’s began to claim democracy cannot be 
achieved overnight and economic development was his priority. Under Mubarak’s regime 
the executive power expanded into controlling elections. There was a continuous renewal 
of the emergency rule every three years since Sadat’s assassination in 1981, which 
                                                        
166 Ibid 
167 BBC World. (2013, July 4). Retrieved July 5, 2013, from Egypt's profile: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13313370 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid, The Many Faces of Political Islam. 
170Ibid, The Many Faces of Political Islam. 
 55  
provided the state with the legal right to control every level of political activity. The 
government was entitled to monitor activities, which limited Egyptians freedom of 
expression and assembly. The emergency rule was used to control and contain legitimate 
political activities such as campaigning. The government would not allow campaign 
gatherings without permission from the Ministry of Interior.  
 Mubarak continued to enforce legislation to reduce political competition and 
participation. According to Law 114 of 1983, the electoral system was changed from the 
previous individual-candidacy to proportional representation system.171 The number of 
constituencies was changed from 176 to 48. All parties would need to gain a minimum of 
8 percent of the nationwide vote, in order for its representatives to enter the People’s 
Assembly. If a party did not achieve this minimum percentage, its vote would 
automatically be credited to the largest party or the National Democratic Party (NDP).172 
This law aimed to exclude independent and minority candidates from gaining any 
political power.  
 All the oppressive and containment tactics fueled violence in Egypt. Mubarak’s 
era produced the highest number of unprecedented politically motivated violence 
involving Islamists.173Political Islam resurged with groups who opposed the regime such 
as the MB. Historically, the MB did not initially reject the established political order 
when it emerged, but held the belief that Egypt’s society was in need of reform to make it 
fully Islamic in a moral and social sense.174 In a society where education was limited to a 
small section of the population, the MBs charitable Islamic education undoubtedly 
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contributed to the popularity and expansion across the country.175 The MBs consistent 
defense of the national cause for society gained the respect and legitimacy on purely 
secular terms and beyond their circle of sympathizers. The Mubarak regime did 
everything to suppress the popular opposition from gaining political ground in Egypt.  
 In February of 2011, Mubarak’s autocratic regime in Egypt proved to be his 
demise when thousands of protesters gathered in Tahrir Square and demanded that he 
resign. After his resignation, the response from the international community was overall 
positive, yet countries such as Iran expressed the need for Egypt to develop their own 
democracy without foreign intervention. President Obama expressed support for 
Egyptians, held the military responsible for ensuring a genuine democratic transition, and 
offered the U.S. assistance as needed.176Iran’s former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 
sentiment, was abrasive towards the U.S. expressing his support for a new Middle East 
developing without U.S. intervention, “a place where arrogant powers will have no 
place.”177 The U.S. past and present intervention in the Middle East have left an 
underlying anti-American sentiment. While Ahmadinejad was known to be hostile 
towards the U.S., his response to Mubarak’s resignation expressed further that people 
should have the right to choose their type of government and rulers.178At the onset of 
Mubarak’s resignation, the military stepped in immediately to guide the government in its 
democratic transition. However, the case of Egypt presents a historical problem of power 
that could potentially resurge given the military’s role in politics.  
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Tunisia 
In 1881, Tunisia became the first Arab country to become a colony under French 
rule. The French implemented a system of absolute power in Tunisia’s foreign relations 
and finances.179 Tunisia was exploited for all of its land and natural resources. The 
French created laws that allowed them to buy and lease land. In turn, the French 
capitalized on farming, the mining industry, and railway and port construction.180 This 
resulted in the emergence of poor Tunisian working classes without labor rights. Foreign 
workers were given favorable positions and colonial bonuses.181 Overall, the French 
colonial rule was through national oppression and bureaucratic tyranny. In regards 
education and religion, the French rule had significant impact with its implementation of 
Roman Catholic schools, clinics and churches.182 The French removed the Islam from the 
education system and further instituted the teachings of Arabic and French. The colonial 
implementation of secularism continued after independence.183 
After leading the country to independence, former President Habib Bourguiba 
remained in office for more than 30 years. Bourguiba was considered a “secular 
nationalist “prioritizing economic development and women’s rights.184 In November of 
1987, Prime Minister Zine El Abidine Ben Ali removed Bourguiba from presidency in a 
bloody coup and declared himself president.185 Ben Ali claimed policies set forth by 
Bourguiba conflicted with his proclaimed democratic plans; therefore, he implemented 
various reforms in the name of democracy. Ali used his democratic platform to bolster 
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his way through elections unopposed.186 Former cabinet members of Bourguiba’s regime 
remained in power under Ben Ali as a part of his democratic process to employ 
bureaucratic strategists. Under both Bourguiba and Ben Ali the state appeared to have a 
strong secular national platform. However, neither leader lived up to their declaratory 
policy of privatizing religion. 
Bourguiba closed a well-known Mosque in the 1970s called al-Zaytunah then 
issued “circular 108”which banned veiling.187 Ben Ali reopened the Mosque but banned 
veiling and the sporting of beards.188 Later in the 1990s, Ben Ali introduced reforms that 
were presented as legal or political changes that sought to deepen pluralism within the 
existing representative bodies. However, these types of reforms appear to be limiting the 
authoritarian practices while legitimizing their rule.189 By implementing different 
political reforms in the name of democracy, Ben Ali tried his best to oppress any political 
opposition that may arise. Ali’s tolerance for Islamist extremist was very low as the 
government continued to take brutal measures against any resistance. In 2002, after the 
bombing of a synagogue, the government arrested suspected Islamists in the masses.190 
While Ben Ali’s regime was later criticized for its oppressive politics, Tunisia’s economy 
                                                        
186 BBC News. (2011, June 20). Profile: Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. Retrieved May 15, 2013, from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12196679 
187 Sadiki, L. (2008). Engendering Citizenship in Tunisia: Prioritizing Unity Over Democracy. In H. 
Amirah-Fernandez, & Y. H. Zoubir, North Africa: Politics, Region, and the Limits of Transformation (pp. 
109-132). Oxon: Routledge. 
188 Ibid.  
189 Gobe, E. (2010). Deceptive Liberal Reforms: Institutional Adjustments and the Dynamics of 
Authoritarianism in Tunisia (1997-2005). In E. Kienle, Democracy Building and Democracy Erosion: 
Political Change North and South of the Mediterranean (pp. 93-111). London: Saqi Books. 
190 Brown, R. V., & Spilling, M. (2009). Cultures of the World Tunisia. Tarrytown: Marshall Cavendish 
Benchmark. 
 59  
grew steadily under his rule. This steady economic growth strengthened ties with the U.S. 
and EU even as democratic freedoms continued to decrease.191 
In the later years of rule, Ben Ali eliminated the three-year term limit for 
president and was re-elected to a fourth five-year term in October of 2004.192 In order to 
maintain power, Ben Ali allowed little to no electoral competition through municipal 
elections. The elections of May 2005 resulted in the ruling Democratic Constitutional 
Rally (RCD) party gaining 4,098 seats out of 4,366 being contested in the 269 communal 
electoral districts.193 Ben Ali’s necessity to maintain control of the state was evident in 
the elections of 2009 when he implemented restrictions on the media and imposed 
sanctions against bloggers and journalists. According to reports, “the RCD monopolized 
prime-time advertising and campaigning, while independent journalists and 
commentators were arrested or assaulted and their publications and even blogs were 
blocked.”194 Later in 2010, parliament passed a law that deemed any form of opposition 
undertakings to be provoked by “agents of a foreign power.”195 
The elite of Tunisia sustained their wealth under Ben Ali’s regime. Tunisia had a 
high level of socioeconomic development, cultural consciousness and political 
sophistication; however, the state maintained control over all private enterprises. During 
periods of increased violence, the state enforced police surveillance and intimidation 
tactics. The pattern of state-led oppression has been maintained through a system of 
social liberalization on one end and political subjugation on the other. Ben Ali’s regime 
relied heavily on the internal factor of power that dictated politics for the area. The era of 
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Ben Ali marked a pattern of oppressive reforms ranged from limiting media publications, 
journalist, television, education and even religious expression.196 
As a result of Ben Ali’s oppressive regime, a little over a year after being exiled, 
the former president was indicted on various charges such as embezzlement and drug 
crimes.197 However, the dilemma revolving around these charges is that Ben Ali is exiled 
in Saudi Arabia and the government has yet to grant Tunisia’s extradite request.198 
Essentially, the Tunisian government cannot convict Ben Ali of any charges when he is 
in a foreign country because that is out of their jurisdiction. The Tunisian governments 
inability to gain access to Ben Ali is only one of the many problems faced in the first year 
after the Arab Spring. The state of Tunisia during year one has been similar to Egypt’s 
with the societal unrest clashes between Islamic groups and security forces. Despite the 
electing Human Rights activist, Moncef Marzouki, in the midst of riots from Islamists the 
government imposed nightly curfews for all citizens.199 
  While the government seemed unable to maintain peace in the region, that did 
not stop them from continuing to restructure laws and policies post-Ben Ali’s regime. 
The parliamentary elections of October 2011 resulted in the Ennadha party a large 
number of seats in the National Assembly.  The Tunisian National Assembly began 
meeting to start drafting a new constitution. The Tunisian government faced early 
criticism of being Islamist-led and their attempts to regain control only seemed to provide 
support for those claims. As the early revisions of the new draft constitution were 
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released to the media, the revisions seem to lessen women rights.200 According to BBC 
World News, the draft constitution referred to women as ‘complementary to men’, 
whereas the 1956 constitution granted women full equality with man.201 The Tunisian 
government seems to have a lot of issues to resolve between maintaining peace in the 
region with Islamist and drafting a new constitution that does not mirror Ben Ali’s ousted 
regime. If the government aims to reach any progress in year two after the Arab Spring, 
then government will have to find a balance between its Islamist and secularist. As the 
Tunisian National Assembly continues to its work in drafting the constitution, it will be 
essential for analyzing the new constitution to see if democratic reforms are 
implemented.  
A Turkish Model 
 Turkey being considered a possible model for countries of the Arab Spring is 
highly debated by politicians.202 The case of Turkey is different because the military has 
acted as the enforcer for democratic and secular reforms, which resulted in fracturing the 
country’s Islamist base. Overtime there has been an increasing wave of modernization 
that has resulted in some of the country’s mainstream Islamist party’s willingness to 
work within the constraints of the constitution.203 Prior to the election of November 2002 
the Western media described the AKP (the Justice and Development party established 
2001) as a fundamentalist party; however, after their victory the same media questioned if 
it was an Islamic or non-Islamic party. The criticism was based on the development of the 
AKP as a reaction to the former authoritarian regime. Since the 1960s, the AKP is the 
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sixth pro-Islamic party in Turkey that survived the Constitutional Courts closures of 
several pro-Islamic parties.204 Today, the AKP supports Turkey’s military alliance with 
the U.S. and promises to advance Turkey’s accession to the EU; however, the AKP does 
still struggle with the military bureaucracy and official state ideology of secularism.205 
 In order to analyze Turkey’s political transformation, it is important to begin with 
the former Ottoman Empire to understand the ideologies that are embedded in its society. 
The Turks built a strong and politically stable empire that expanded to Asia, Europe and 
Africa. Islam at that time was seen as a form of identity, legitimacy, and unity for the 
Turks. A former practice of the Ottomans was to wage Gaza wars or wars in the name of 
expanding Islam.206 In present, Turkey this ideology remains at the center-right and the 
Turkish military. The control of religion was essential to the political agenda and 
continued in the Republican Turkey.207 Islam along with other religions has always been 
subordinate and controlled by the state. This is a major part in the secularization of 
modern Turkey, which is linked to the Ottoman legacy. During the Ottoman rule under 
the Sultan, he introduced a series of reforms known as Tanzimat Era from 1830-1860.208 
The reforms were described as modernization through centralization of the legal system, 
bureaucracies, and education. Education reforms included sending students to countries 
such as Germany and France to study.209 As a result, a new class of young educated 
Turks was created. Some of these reforms were justified in the name of Islam.  
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 In the next century under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the first president of Turkey, 
the reforms continued in the name of modernity with the creation of the Diyanetİşleri 
Başkanlığıor the Presidency of Religious Affairs after the elimination of the caliphate.210 
The Diyanet was created solely to control religious affairs with a mission to work within 
the principles of secularism with the goal of achieving national solidarity and 
integration.211 The Turkish state power expanded to owning mosques and appointing 
religious officials as salaried state employees under the Diyanet. Today, the main 
function is “to stress that social utility of Islam in the well being of the state and 
nation.”212 
 The tradition and culture during the Ottoman Empire were different from 
Atatürk’s vision for Turkey. In short, during the Ottoman period all laws and institutions 
were linked to Islam versus the ideology of the Kemalist state, which focused on 
contemporary civilization. The Kemalist state sought to transform Turkey into a 
civilization that emulated the European society. The Kemalist ideology is based on 
Turkish nationalism and secularism. Secularism in the Kemalist ideology involves 
removing religion from the public and placing it under the state’s control.213 The usage of 
secularism as a tool to control religion is different from the view of secularism in 
Western democracies. The view of secularism in Western democracies is the separation 
between church and state with no interrelation between the two components. The reforms 
undertaken by Atatürk included attempting to eliminate the usage of Islam as a source of 
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legitimacy. For example, the education system was reformed to separate it from religion 
with creating a new non-Islamic alphabet, dress code, and official rest days.  
The Kemalist reforms were also influenced by World War II as the international 
system changed. Later the Cold War presented its on implications on Turkey’s 
security.214Turkey implemented a multi-party system similar to the West between 1950 
and 1983. The multi-party system left tensions between the elected and unelected military 
guardians. During this time, it is important to note Turkey’s economic struggle and 
military aid from the U.S. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) joined the North American 
Treaty Organization (NATO) to gain access to resources for education and economic 
development. The membership also meant “an unelected military and civilian 
bureaucracy versus the newly elected government.”215 This development presents a clear 
indication of dual-sovereignty in Turkey that exists today as the AKP operates in efforts 
to avoid military conflict.  
The Turkish military became the enforcers of Turkey’s modernization and 
secularism. In the midst of the Turkish transformation, pro-Islamic parties began to 
change as well. Under Halil Turgut Özal between 1983 and 1993, there was an evolution 
of a liberal Islamic movement because of new opportunities and the EU accession.216 The 
transformation of political Islam in Turkey can be explained by certain internal and 
external factors. First, the expansion of opportunities in media and politics opened doors 
for new roles for Islamic actors. Secondly, the constitutional changes removed the ban on 
Islamic parties in the political arena. In turn, a new class of young educated Muslim 
politicians learned to work within the political process of the elite. Lastly, Turkey’s 
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commitment to joining the EU has drastically changed political Islam for the area. Turkey 
embarked on the criteria set by the Copenhagen Council in the summer of 1993 and since 
then major political reforms have occurred.217 The EU accession presented implications 
on the future of Turkish politics. The trajectory of the EU accession would not have been 
possible without the military’s enforcement.  The military maintains a unique role in 
society through the involvement with civilian politics and ousting democratically elected 
that have resulted a continuation of positive civilian-military relations. The Turkish 
government also viewed the EU accession as the last step in modernization.218 
In 2001, fundamental rights were passed that included freedom of expression, 
personal liberties, and media. Turkey also pursued “major legal reforms that transformed 
state-society relations at the expense of the state power.”219Therefore, a portion of 
Islamic parties are more willing work within the existing state. This is a major indication 
that democratic institutions and modern political Islam can coexist. The historical 
patterns of autocratic regimes show when Islamic political organizations resurge they 
continue with an agenda to overthrow the government and tend to become violent. 
Muslim democrats have learned how to frame religious concerns of secularism so they 
appeal to other religious groups.220 There has also been a great level of compromise 
between Muslim democrats and Islamist.  
While Turkey has continued on trajectory of progression towards the EU 
accession, the country now seems to facing a period of stagnation. Reports indicate that 
Prime Minister Erdogan has enacted laws increasing the government control over the 
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courts and further threatening to implement censorship of the web.221 The Turkish 
economy is not in the strongest position. Currently, Turkey has the largest deficit as an 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) country.222 In 
addition to Turkey’s workforce facing a spike in unemployment and gender inequality. 
Turkey’s political ambitions towards the EU accession seem to have subsided, as 
domestic issues are major concerns.  
Overall, Turkey’s history is different from other Muslim countries for many 
reasons starting with the fact that it was never colonized or subject to European imperial 
rule. Secondly, the Turks were the creators of their own way of life.  The Turkish 
government implemented democratic reforms without foreign involvement. Next, 
Turkey’s relationship with the U.S. dates back to the Ottoman Empire, which is rare in 
the Arab world. Turkey’s interactions with the U.S. and experiences with democracy 
have existed longer than most Muslim countries.223 The Turkish democratic process has 
continued throughout its history with experiments in parliamentary democracy. Turkey 
made a choice towards modernization to better their relationship with the U.S. While the 
measures have changed, all Turkish leaders held democracy as the medicine for a civil 
society.224 One of the keys in Turkey’s democratic success has been its progressive 
nature. Instead of implementing drastic reforms at once, Turkish leaders have 
implemented phases of limited democracy to encourage what they believed to be a civil 
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society. Turkey is heir to the traditions of the separation of the politics from the religious 
arena.225 
Recommendations  
The challenges of sustainability for Muslim democracies depend on the internal 
and external factors of political Islam, power, past and present foreign intervention. The 
study of Egypt and Tunisia present historical obstacles for all the factors and further 
imply challenges for the current democratic transitions. The dictators in both countries 
previously implemented temporary democratic reforms for their own political interest 
with countries such as the U.S. Therefore, as the countries continue their democratic 
transitions it is important for them to develop reforms and change the infrastructure of 
government similar to Turkey. The factors that have contributed to the Turkish 
democracy are secularism, a commitment to modernization, proper enforcement of 
democratic reforms and the accession to the EU.  
In order for democracy to exist in Egypt and Tunisia, the government will have to 
develop a way to control the influence of religion in politics through the collaboration of 
Islamist and Secularist.  Secularism for Turkey was not the complete removal of religion 
from society, but rather a process to prevent its impact. This process in recent times is the 
result of Islamist and Secularist working towards the goal of EU accession. The 
collaboration multiple political parties allow Islamist; Secularist, Socialist and even 
Independents have a voice in governance. Further, increase in political participation adds 
to the legitimacy of governments. The transitional governments of both Egypt and 
Tunisia should be eager to establish reforms that legitimize their commitments to 
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democracy.  The enforcement of the democratic reforms will also factor into the country's 
stability. Turkey and Egypt’s military’s role in politics present power struggles to sustain 
and establish democracy. As the study presented, democratic reforms require the proper 
changes to infrastructure and power shifts in governance.  
Conclusion 
The compatibility between Islam and democracy has proven to be circumstantial. 
While countries of Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia and Bangladesh indicate Muslim 
democracies are attainable; this study presents the factors of why such democracies are 
marginal. The factors of political Islam, power, past and foreign intervention have 
contributed to the lack of sustainability in Muslim democracies throughout the Arab 
world. In this study, Islam and democracy were defined to analyze initial conflicts of 
compatibility beyond the historical patterns of authoritarian regimes in the region. The 
analysis of Islam provided an understanding of universal principles of the faith in order to 
explain the ideology of political Islam. Political Islam acts an instrument for individuals, 
groups, and organizations to pursue their own political objectives. In turn, political Islam 
is seen as a violent ideology used by Islamist extremist organizations. The theory of 
democracy is analyzed and presents conflicts with the U.S. view of liberal democracy for 
the Arab world. As a result, liberal autocracy shows how problematic the assertion of 
liberal reforms has been for Egypt and Tunisia.  
Egypt’s history shows a continuation of autocratic rule that increased the power of 
the state. The rulers of Egypt shared a common theme of implementing temporary 
democratic reforms coupled with the priority of economic growth. Mubarak’s desire for 
centralized power was seen in Mubarak’s reforms to the economy, treatment on 
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fundamental rights, and the reduction in political competition. Now that the military has 
taken the responsibility of ensuring a genuine democratic transition, the military’s role in 
politics becomes another factor in the democratization.    
In the case of Tunisia, Bourguiba’s implementation of secularism and 
modernization failed to have long-term impacts on society due to the structure of 
centralized power. The Tunisian government under Bourguiba, kept the military 
apolitical, prohibited opposition groups from infiltrating the political system. Therefore, 
the secular reforms lacked enforcement and further were viewed as methods of power. 
Bourguiba’s focus on secularism resulted in a struggling economy. When Ben Ali 
assumed power, he campaigned on weaknesses of Tunisia under Bourguiba. However, 
Ben Ali, just as his predecessor, wanted to centralize the power of the state and eliminate 
political opposition. Overtime, Tunisians, felt greater restrictions of fundamental rights 
and freedoms than under the previous dictator.  
The historic trends of the Arab world present Turkey as a possible model for the 
countries of the Arab Spring. The study of Turkey's history shows the sustainability of 
democracy through government-enforced secularism, effective implementation of 
modernization, and possibility of accession the EU. The state-enforced secularism 
allowed the government to manipulate the influence of Islam in society. The process of 
implementing secularism and modernization was not peaceful process, and Turkey has a 
history of religious and ethnic conflicts. However, by the early 1980s, the Turkish 
government seen the benefits of the EU membership and started to implement democratic 
reforms to ensure the rights of religious and ethnic groups. The secular reforms in Turkey 
required a proper infrastructure and enforcement to sustain democracy. Egypt and Tunisia 
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can learn from Turkey’s progress in democratization; however, the foundation needed to 
sustain democracy will require reformations of additional factors to overcome historically 
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 In the wake of 2014, the countries of the Arab Spring are now in the midst of their 
third anniversary since the revolutions and uprisings. Egypt and Tunisia have both 
completed their first free and fair elections since the ousting of autocratic rulers. The 
democratic transitions have been plagued within the last two years due to both regions 
struggle to maintain civil order and peace. However, the Tunisian government has 
managed to prevail in instituted and further enforcing democratic reforms. While the 
Islamists in Egypt remain unsatisfied, tensions are high in the region with the military’s 
campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) last year after ousting democratically 
elected president Mohammed Morsi. Critics of democratization in the Middle East argue 
that democratic elections allow Islamic militant regimes to resurge and further may 
develop anti-democratic governments.226The anti-democratic regimes that are feared 
essentially occurred under authoritarian regimes. The issues lies with how democratic 
elections reveal bureaucratic issues that have hindered democratization in the region such 
as the military’s role in politics, Islamic political organizations, and the cooperation or 
lack there of between Islamist and secularist.  
 The analysis of the bureaucratic issues as noted above is discussed in both Tunisia 
and Egypt. Through this analysis it is determined which factors have contributed to 
Tunisia’s continued progress in democratization over Egypt. The results of this analysis 
will aid in demystifying the fear of anti-democratic regimes as a result democratic 
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elections and further indicate the importance of examining these factors in the future for 
Muslim democracies. This chapter concludes with recommendations and an outlook into 
the future of both countries democratic transitions.  
Tunisia 
 The Military’s Role in Politics  
 Tunisia has remained a unique region in the uprisings of the Arab Spring. From a 
street vendor setting himself on fire and making international headlines to its own 
uprisings being named the “Jasmine Revolution.”227 In recent news, the Tunisian 
government has been recognized by John Kerry, the United States (U.S.) Secretary of 
State, for its continued progress towards democracy since January of 2011.228 After Ben 
Ali and his family fled the country, the odds of Tunisia successfully carrying out free and 
fair elections, while controlling the violence were slim in retrospect to the chaos 
surrounding its borders. When comparing Tunisia to its neighboring countries, the region 
is considerably smaller than Algeria, Libya and Egypt. The size of Tunisia suggests 
major implication on its military such as the size and its role in the region. 
 The Tunisian military was composed of about 36,000 soldiers, as of 2011, across 
the Army, Armed Forces, Navy, and Air Force.229Tunisia’s military expenditure average 
from 2010 to 2012 was approximately 1.48%. The relatively low military expenditure 
shows that Tunisia did not face major external threats and Ben Ali ensured the military 
was not threatening to his rule.230The Tunisian military has a long-standing relationship 
history with the U.S. The U.S. has not only provided financial assistance but has 
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supported the military since Tunisia’s independence by providing weapons and joint 
training exercises.231Approximately 70% of the Tunisians military equipment is of U.S. 
origin. 232 Further the country is one of only a selected few that has cadets actually 
stationed in the U.S.233 The Tunisian military’s size and relationship with the U.S. 
presents major implications on its characteristics.   
 In order to understand civilian-military relations in Tunisia, there has to be an 
historical analysis of the military’s role in the society. Historically, the Tunisian military 
never revolted against the state or involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict.234 The military 
has essentially always upheld the states authority up until January of 2011. In the Habib 
Bourguiba period, the military was characterized as resembling the French army with the 
purpose of defending the nation from all domestic and foreign threats.235Bourguiba took 
pride in maintaining a virtuous military. In doing so, he banned all military personnel 
from having any legal political affiliations, including associations with the ruling 
party.236Bourguiba further secluded the military officers from any state affairs and denied 
the military any role in the modernization of Tunisia.  
 During this period, the military served as defenders of the nations security and 
integrity.237As a result, the Tunisian military was more of a civilian force in charge of 
securing and upholding Bourguiba’s ideal of Tunisian nationalism. Bourguiba 
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intentionally kept the military small with limited weaponry.  His vision followed that of 
the Kemalist ideology – which was to have a system of organizations where the power 
was centered on secularism and Western values.238In Bourguiba’s view, this type of 
system would maintain harmony and defend his ideals without any interruption.239 
Therefore, the military assumed the role as police officers for civilian control, which left 
a feeling of discontent amongst the soldiers.240 In 1980, the military faced the threats 
from Colonel Qaddafi in the southern area of the country and realized how weak they 
were in comparison to the Libyan military.241 However, Bourgubia refrained from 
investing in any new technologies for the military, instead he began to allow the military 
personnel to take on professional service jobs. The downfall of professional service jobs 
for military personnel was the fact that Bourguiba only allowed them to work these jobs 
at the military pay rate. In sum, the military under Bourguiba could be described as an 
apolitical and non-modernizing institution focused solely on reestablishing the status quo 
of Tunisia.242 
 In 1987, Ben Ali assumed the position of president and removed Bourguiba from 
office citing the constitution in his defense. Ben Ali’s career experience provided insight 
on how the military’s role may have changed in Tunisia. Prior to being appointed as 
Prime Minister under Bourguiba, Ben Ali was one of the first class officers to lead 
Tunisia to independence.243  Ben Ali ‘s career in the military led him to studying artillery 
services at Fort Bliss in Texas, securing a degree in electrical engineering, and landing a 
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job as the Director of Military Security.244 Later, Ben Ali was appointed as the Tunisian 
Ambassador of Warsaw, Secretary of State or National Defense and finally Minister of 
Interior.245 Therefore, when Ben Ali became president there was an underlying 
assumption that the military would become heavily involved in politics due to his 
military career. In the early years of presidency, his changes to the military were seen 
through promotions of officers, restructuring of the defense infrastructure and in the 
implementation of new defense organizations. Ben Ali promoted military personnel in the 
Army and Air Force who had proven knowledge of technological capabilities.246 
 The restructuring of the defense infrastructure and the implementation of new 
defense organization were both seen in the same context. The Council of National 
Security was created to gather data and assess defense policies (domestic and 
international) in order to safeguard Tunisia against any possible threats.247 The coalition’s 
major achievement was uncovering a terrorist network attempting to smuggle arms into 
the region.248 The composition of the coalition was of lieutenants, generals and the heads 
of defense ministries. 249 Ben Ali’s next move was the isolation of the military from the 
police and security forces. During the 1990s, Ben Ali employed 120,000 to 200,00 police 
and security patrol under the control of the Ministry of Interior.250 
 The coalition and defense ministries became a tool in the military’s involvement in 
state affairs. However, Ben Ali still encouraged the sentiment of Tunisian nationalism 
just as his predecessor. The difference between the two lied in Ben Ali’s control and 
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desire to have a secured state. The military expenditures were high during his time as 
president but its still unclear how the funds were actually spent. The Tunisian military 
equipment from the U.S. and France were outdated.251 In contrast to the Egyptian 
military, Ben Ali did not conserve any private enterprises; nor did the military personnel 
have career advancements to the state or retirement benefits.252 Ben Ali strategically kept 
the military‘s daily responsibilities to humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and border 
patrol.253 Interestingly, the military did not function in Tunis the police and other security 
forces controlled by the Ministry of Interior.254 
 Therefore in January of 2011,when Ben Ali called the military to intervene in 
Tunis, the severity of the uprisings was at its peak. The police and security forces were 
overwhelmed and no longer able to control the protesters as more demonstrations broke 
out across Tunisia. However, when General Rachid Ammar, Army Chief of Staff, 
declined Ben Ali’s request and disengaged his troops from Tunis, this marked history for 
the Tunisian military.255 Historically, the Tunisian military did not participate or 
intervene in political activity to this magnitude. The refusals of the military to repress 
protesters sparked the initial ending of the regime. Ben Ali’s systematic approach to 
separating the military in general led to his demise. 
 The decision of the Tunisian military to not violently repress protesters and uphold 
the revolution, proved how powerful the Tunisian military was at that time. Based on the 
historical analysis of the military’s role in politics, this decision by General Ammar is not 
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as surprising. The Tunisian military were never power a driven entity or sought out a part 
in politics like the Egyptian military. General Ammar’s pledge to uphold the revolution, 
until elections showed a level of cooperation that is unique to the Arab world. The Arab 
world is characterized by its authoritarian regimes that are either supported by the 
military or battling with the military for power. The Tunisian military in the Bourguiba 
period was for the people and a Tunisian nationalism. Therefore, it would be unlikely for 
the military to support Ben Ali fighting against the people, especially with his treatment 
of the military. Based on the historical analysis, the military endured harsh conditions as 
the defenders of the nation, just as ordinary Tunisians. The Tunisian military is 
continuing to combat terrorism and remain out of politics. This is one of the major 
reasons why Tunisia has continued to progress in its democratic transition because there 
is no opposition between the state and the military as witnessed in Egypt.  
 In February of this year, the U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, visited Tunisia and 
commended the government on their progress in democratization. Kerry said, “No 
democracy can survive or prosper without security.”256 The Tunisian military efforts in 
the revolution and transition are well respected by the U.S. government. During the visit, 
Kerry also announced the U.S. would be giving the military a high-tech vehicle to help in 
terrorist investigations.257 Since the revolution, the U.S. has provided increased training 
and funds to the Tunisian military.258 
 Islamic Political Organizations  
 Islamic Political Organization or Party’s are perceived as Islamist who want to 
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insert traditional Islam into secular politics. The degree to which this is carried out varies 
within different organizations and even regions. In the study of Islamic party’s there are 
various factors to consider such as the country, party interest, history and current actions 
in pursuing their interests. Recently, Islamic parties have been called extremist and 
terrorist groups.259 However, not all Islamic parties are violent or involved in politics. 
Islamic parties becoming more violent and persistent in entering politics can in some 
cases be the result of an issue with the social conditions of society. 
 The history of Tunisia’s Islamic movements supports that claim. In the 1970s, the 
Quranic Preservation Society was established with the purpose to encourage “piety and 
faithfulness.”260The society was approved by the government and shared similar reviews 
as the regime. Reportedly, the Society accepted their place under the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs and did not feel as if they needed to further infiltrate themselves into 
government.261 However, in the latter part of the 1970s, this sentiment began to change as 
the social conditions worsened. During this time social unrest was seemingly high along 
with frustrations due to the division of labor in Tunisia. As a result, members of the 
Society left to form al-Jamaat al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group).262 The founder, Rachid 
al Ghannouchi quickly set the Groups mission to end Bourguiba’s one-party system.263 
The conditions in the late 1970s involved high unemployment and poor living conditions 
as a result of the harsh economic times. The anti-Bourguibat ime for the Group evolved 
into the “Movement of Islamic Renewal.”264 
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 The Movement of Islamic Renewal ignited in the 1980s with a significant impact 
on society. Formerly, the Islamic Group, the Movement de la Tendence Islamique (MTI), 
redefined its purpose to promote economic reform, institute the fundamental principles of 
Islam and continue its efforts to end the one-party rule of Bourguiba.265 At that time, their 
purpose alone gained support from people all over Tunisia. The MTI attempted to gain 
legal party status but was denied and some of its leaders were even jailed.266 However, 
the MTI was very organized and expanded their platform to include the promotion of 
civil rights and liberties for the people. This essentially made the MTI be viewed as the 
first pro-democratic group to express its support for pluralism.267 
 By the late 1980s, Ben Ali assumed power and Ghannouchi, founder of the MTI, 
agreed to work with the new president. Initially, Ghannouchi signed the “National Pact,” 
which was a social contract between the state and Islamic groups related to the MTI.268 In 
return, Ghannouchi expected he would be able to propose a list of candidates to run in the 
upcoming legislative elections. However, not soon after the Pact was signed, Ben Ali 
reversed his decision and prohibited any Islamic party or group with the word Islamic or 
Islam in its name from running in any election.269 This prohibition still existed as of 2013 
in Tunisia. As a result of this ruling the MTI, renamed itself to Hizb Ennadha, the 
Renaissance Party. Unfortunately, Ben Ali still refused to grant the Ennadha legal party 
status to run in the legislative elections. The Ennadha’s ideological framework was 
summed up in Ghannochi’s view of an Islamic political government that encompassed an 
elected president and parliament by people, which would legitimize political 
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participation.270 
 Upon Ghannouchi’s return to Tunisia, after being exiled in 1989, he returned to the 
party being legalized and able to run in the legislative elections. During a civil society 
conference, Ghannouci expressed his wish for the separation between church and state 
similar to the U.S. liberal democracy.271Ghannouchi denounced Islam being imposed by 
the state because in every instance the state took this approach revolutions would occur. 
The founding principles of the Ennadha are the reasons why the party was able to 
increase its support over the years despite Ben Ali’s oppressive tactics. The Ennadha 
party was legalized in March of 2011 and won a large number of seats Tunisia’s first 
democratic elections after Ben Ali stepped down as president of the country.272 Critics of 
the party believed the victory has led a path for religious politics to resurge; however, the 
parties founding platform was against political Islam governed by the state.273 
 Contrary to the opposing views, the Ennadha’s supporters believe the party 
provides the balance of power needed to progress towards democracy. After the electoral 
victory, Ghannouchi feelings were expressed in this quote: 
“Our vision of Islam is a moderate one and since 1981…we have declared that we 
accept democracy without any restrictions and we accept the decision of the people 
whether they come with us or against us.”274 
In the early stages of governance, the Ennadha party has faced hurdles as the party’s 
success is under a microscope with the world watching as Tunisia continues to progress 
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towards democratization. Thus far, the Ennadha party is challenging the conventional 
wisdom that democratic provides a pathway for Islamic governance and as its presence in 
government has negative implications. 
 However, another factor in the study of Islamic political organizations involve 
discussing the extremist presence in the region. In Tunisia, marginal portions of the more 
violent Islamic groups tend to be less organized and smaller. The Hizb al-Tahrir (The 
Liberation Party) is considered one of Tunisia’s most dangerous parties. The Ali-Tahrir 
seeks to establish an Islamic state ran by a supreme religious leader known as the 
Caliphate.275 What makes this party dangerous is the degree to which the party is willing 
to accomplish its mission by force or rebellion. The Al-Tahrir along with the Tunisian 
Sunni party sought legal party status in March of 2012, but was denied by the Interior 
Minister.276 Critics believe if the Al-Tahrir was to win an election, then Tunisia would 
revert back to a one-party rule.277 
 Another noteworthy group is the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG). This group 
was formed in 2000 with the desire to create an Islamic regime. The TCG has known 
contacts with Al-Qaeda and was responsible for terrorist acts in Europe, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq.278 The group is not on the list of terrorist organization; however, it is recognized as a 
terrorist entity and their assets were frozen under the EO 13224 and UN Security Council 
Resolution 1333.279 The TCG has known support from other terrorist organizations and 
jihadist throughout Arab world, which makes the group a threat for the state, to watch. 
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 Tunisia’s extremist Islamic parties have been marginal in their impact on politics. 
However, recently Salafism has been growing throughout the region. Prior to the 
revolution in 2011, the Salafists presence in Tunisia was minimal and the organization 
seemed apolitical. Salafism is described as a relatively large category of “religiously 
conservative social movements,” and to the right of the Ennadha party.280 Therefore, it is 
hard to classify the actions of certain groups under the Salafism because the movements 
vary based on different regions. In Tunisia, the Salafist have made their presence known 
by several arson attacks and University disturbances, which has resulted in the Religious 
Affairs ministry closely monitoring the Salafists developments. President Marzouki said, 
“…Some Salafists pose a that against democracy.”281 However, Markzouki does not want 
to impose repressive tactics and further granted the Salafist Reform Front (Islah) a license 
to operate under the Political Parties law.282 Despite this issuance, the Ennadha party 
continues to denounce critics in its pursuit of democracy through the cooperation of 
Islamists and Secularists. 
 Islamists and Secularists  
 Tunisia’s road since the uprisings has continued upward. The country has held 
democratic elections, the drafting of a new constitution, and most recently President 
Marzouki lifted the three-year state of emergency that was in place.283 What has been 
ground breaking in Tunisia, is the cooperation between the Ennadha party and secularists. 
In the elections on October 23, 2011, the Ennadha party was victorious in winning a 
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majority of the seats in the Constituent Assembly.284 Supporters of the conventional 
wisdom quickly declared this would reverse the revolution.285 However, what critics of 
the Ennadha neglected to consider, is the history of Islam and Secularism in Tunisia. 
 The Bourguiba period in Tunisia was marked by his efforts to implement 
secularism into Tunisia’s nationalism. Bourguiba’s efforts were recognized in his 
leadership of the New Destour party’s nationalism movement. After independence and 
becoming President Bourguiba implemented several forms in the name of secularism 
such as woman voting rights, the secular Personal Legal Code, and reformed education 
with the removal of Islam to a more universal curriculum.286 The only other country that 
took similar measures to promote secularism was Turkey. Bourguiba tried to implement a 
strong presidential constitutional system but the religious elements in place were never 
truly eliminated to ensure the longevity of his efforts.287 The elements of religion in 
society and further in politics had a lot to do with the countries transition from French 
rule. Islam provided a source of identity for Tunisians. In addition to Islam being 
embedded in society as a social culture.288 
 Bourguiba measures to implement secularism were eventually met by Islamic 
resistance. What Bourguiba failed to do was to develop initiatives that would collectively 
mobilize Tunisian’s and provide prosperity for all. The harsh economic times of 
Bourguiba’s governance led to the people relying on Islam for hope and rallying around 
Islamic groups that promoted better social conditions.289 The Tunisian fundamentalism 
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that steadily grew was anti-secular. Supporters of this movement felt the Islamic way of 
life would result in the redistribution of wealth and would render Tunisians from any 
foreign powers.290 The threat to Bourguiba’s secularism was continued throughout his 
entire presidency. The supporters of the Tunisian fundamentalism movement were 
unemployed, typically young and overall dissatisfied with the failed promises of 
economic advancement through modernization.291 While there was constant struggle 
between Islamist and Bourguiba’s secularism, the government held strong with its 
unwillingness to let Islam into Tunisian politics. At the highest peaks of violence, 
Bourguiba reacted by jailing major Islamic leaders. The desire to keep Islam out of the 
political realm continued with Bourguiba’s successor Ben Ali. Ben Ali made this a 
priority by not allowing Islamic party’s to run in legislative elections and never justifying 
his action as president in the name of Islam.292 
 Now that Ben Ali is no longer president, the country has continued to pursue the 
mission of secularism. Tunisia’s Islamist extremist groups are weaker than in the 
neighboring countries. The military has take action to suppress any violent Islamist 
activity, in order to maintain civil order. The civil order and cooperation witnessed in the 
Tunisian government is quite different from other countries in the Arab world. Tunisia’s 
origins of secularism are deeply rooted. The Ennadha party is an Islamic party with 
democratic roots; therefore, it is less likely for Tunisian to revert back to an authoritarian 
regime. The Constituent Assembly is composed of Islamic, secular, and socialist 
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parties.293 
 The parties struggled in the beginning to agree on anything and some of members 
called for dissolution of the Islamist-led government in part because Ennadha had a large 
number of seats in the Constituent Assembly and party member Hamadi Jebali was 
elected as Prime Minister.294 However, between 2011 and 2013, there was a lot of static 
between the Ennadha party, PM Jebali and other parties. After a well-known opposition 
leader, Chokei Belaid, was assassinated, Jebali declared plans for a new government.295 
This did not mesh well with the Ennadha party and after a series of public debates, Jebali 
resigned. Ali Larayedh, Jebali’s successor, who was also a member of the Ennadha party, 
later resigned after continued public protest for his resignation.296 The Tunisian people 
were dissatisfied with the Ennadha’s government’s inability to manage the transition 
shortly after the elections.297 
 However, now that there has been major power shifts in the states the situation 
appears to be calmer. In an effort to bring peace into the government and end protests, the 
Ennadha party agreed to allow a new president and prime minister from an independent 
party.298 President Moncef Marzouki, from the Congress for the Republic party, and 
Mehdi Jomaa from an independent party were both elected by the Constituent 
Assembly.299 The case of Tunisia is positive and its progress towards democratization 
must be closely monitored. The Ennadha party essentially handed over some of their 
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power to show their willingness to cooperate and promote peace in the state. The 
Tunisian government has dealt with months of public protests, violent opposition, and 
resignations. Through all the adversity the Ennadha party has continued its mission in 
pursuit of democracy. The new constitution signed at the end of January this year, shows 
the effectiveness in the cooperation between Islamist and Secularists. First, the references 
to Islamic law have been removed and gender equality has been inserted.300The new 
constitution further guarantees the religious freedoms of religions other than Islam.301 
While the new constitution is the beginning, it is a major milestone for the country since 
the uprisings in January of 2011. Tunisia’s progress can be used as a model for other 
countries such as Egypt.  
Egypt 
 The Military’s Role in Politics 
 Today, the Egyptian military plays a pivotal role in politics and social unrest. In the 
past three years, the military has ousted two presidents: Hosni Mubarak and 
democratically elected Mohamed Morsi.302 The military was composed of about 450,00 
officers, as of 2011, across the Army, Navy, Air Force and Air Defense.303 Between 
2010-2012, the military expenditures have averaged about 1.76% of the GDP.304 Egypt 
has received assistance from the U.S. in annual military aid, training and through the 
purchasing of military equipment. In 2005, Egypt’s defense budget approximately took 
up about 3.4% of the economy, with U.S. aid occupying about 25% of the defense 
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spending. The U.S.-Egypt relations date back to Egypt’s independence from the United 
Kingdom. Both party’s diplomatic interests have aligned with peace and stability in the 
Middle East. In addition to promoting economic growth in Egypt and regional security 
concerns. To better understand how Egypt’s military has developed into such a decisive 
force, there has to be an historical analysis of its role. 
 Unlike the Tunisian military, the Egyptian military’s power and influence in 
politics was seen shortly after independence from the British. In 1952, a military coup 
known as the Free Officers Movement ousted King Farouk and declared Egypt a 
Republic. A few years later, one of the coups leaders Gamal Abdel Nasser became 
president of Egypt. During Nasser’s rule, Britain, France and Israel attempted an invasion 
to reclaim the Suez Canal, but were unsuccessful. However, over a decade later, Israeli 
forces in the Six-Day war along with Syria and Jordan defeated Egypt.305One of the most 
important impacts on the military under Nasser’s rule was his decision to appoint military 
officers to regulatory and economic positions. 
 Upon his death, in 1970, his vice president, Anwar al-Sadat became president. 
Sadat’s initial measure, as president was to reduce the number of military officers in 
government.306 In addition to, refocusing the military’s role towards foreign affairs such 
as national security. Another important measure was the peace treaty with Egypt and 
Israel. The negotiations between Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister led to a Nobel Prize 
for Peace in 1978.307 This was the first peace treaty that Israel had with any Arab state. 
Sadat was assassinated at a military parade in 1981. When his predecessor, Hosni 
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Mubarak, took office, all of Sadat’s efforts to decrease the military power were 
completely reversed. Mubarak’s biggest impact on military was shifting its focus from 
national security to the economy. This was seen in the Ministry of Defense’s creation of 
the National Service Products Organization (NSPO), Ministry of Military Production 
(MOMP), and the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI).308 All of these 
company’s purposes revolved about the production of goods and services.  
 Essentially, the military owned untaxed factories, farms and companies. The 
military ended up owning majority of public goods such gas stations, parking lots, and 
grocery stores.309The reforms were all in regards to Mubarak’s economic liberalization 
plan for Egypt. Mubarak further guaranteed military officers positions in the government 
upon retirement. This was one of benefits that the Tunisian military lacked. The retired 
military officers received government salaries and military pensions. The retired military 
officers and generals were appointed to positions as governors, heads of state-owned oil 
companies and the transportation systems.310 The problem with Mubarak’s privatization 
of military enterprises was that there was never a transfer of enterprises to allow 
Egyptians outside of the military to benefit. 
 In 2011, anti-Mubarak protesters began to demand that he resign as president. The 
demonstrations appeared to be fueled by Tunisians call for president Ben Ali to step 
down.311 Mubarak attempted to reorganize his cabinet and announced he would resign in 
September of that year. However, as protests got larger and spread across the country, 
Mubarak stepped down in February of that year. Immediately after Mubarak stepped 
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down, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took over Egypt for a year and 
a half. During this period, the SCAF asserted its control in the judiciary, expanded the 
military’s businesses and established relations with Islamic organizations including the 
MB. The SCAF granted immunity to retired military officers that were charged of 
corruption and opened up an industrial chemical plant.312 Even with the SCAFs efforts to 
boost the economy, all the state-owned enterprises revenue never reached average 
Egyptian households. 
 The SCAFs relationship with the MB had major implications on the military’s 
influence in politics. Critics believed this relationship resulted in president Morsi winning 
the democratic elections.313Morsi’s opposition claimed there were voting violations 
backed by the SCAF during the elections. However, the relationship between the SCAF 
and MB member Morsi began to unfold shortly after elections.314 First, the SCAF issued 
a constitution declaration to remove any authority Morsi would have other the armed 
forces. In hopes of maintaining a good relationship with the SCAF, Morsi appointed 
more army officers to governor and minister positions. Morsi went further to ratify the 
newly drafted constitution to ensure the military sustained its independent status and 
control over its own budget.315 The legislative had to consult with the military before 
issuing any laws that would impact the armed forces.316Morsi granted the military 
multiple advantages and benefits, such as continuing to expand untaxed military 
businesses and increasing the number of state-owned businesses that went under the 
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military enterprises.317 
 Morsi’s provisions in favor of the military fell short of approval and were not 
enough to avoid the military coup that removed him from power in June of 2013. During 
the period leading up to Morsi’s removal, the MB and other Islamic organizations were 
accused of kidnapping soldiers. In turn, the military reacted violently and this sparked 
period of violent clashes between the military and Islamic organizations. General al-Sisi 
responded by implementing counter-terrorism strategies against the MB.318  The violence 
continued and was further heightened by Morsi’s removal. General al-Sisi viewed the 
ousting of Morsi as the right plan of action for Egypt,  “We will build an Egyptian society 
that is strong and stable, that will not exclude any of the its sons.”319 The first measures 
General al-Sisi implemented was suspending the constitution drafted by the MB and 
appointed the interim president, Adli Mansour with elections to occur sometime this 
year.320The roadmap towards democracy led by General al-Sisi included the drafting of a 
new constitution followed by presidential and parliamentary elections. However, in 
reaction to this roadmap there has been an array of violence amongst Islamic 
organizations. As a result the military began jailing thousands of MB leaders and burning 
down the organizations headquarters. The next section further discusses the MB presence 
in Egypt and their influence on politics. 
 Islamic Political Organizations  
 The MB is Egypt’s largest and oldest Islamic organization. In 1928, the MB was 
founded by Hassan al-Banna, with the purpose of spreading the Islamic moral and good 
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works to the people.321The MB sought a complete transformation in the world order. 
While the group aimed to create an Islamic state, they were able to garner support at the 
grass-root level through civil works in the community that helped Egypt’s lower and 
middle classes.322 The MB ran mosques and schools throughout Egypt. By the 1940s, the 
group’s membership was about 500,000.323 As the membership continued to grow, Al-
Banna felt the organization needed a military force to combat British rule known as the 
Special Apparatus. The Special Apparatus was said to be responsible for violent 
massacres and assassinations.324Al-Banna denounced the accusations that the MB was 
responsible for the assassination of former Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi. 
However, the government tired to dissolve the group and Al-Banna was assassinated in 
1928. Later, the MB was targeted for the failed assassination attempt of President Nasser. 
This resulted in the group being banned, tortured and imprisoned.  
 By the 1980s, the MB attempted to reposition itself in politics by fostering a 
relationship with the government similar to the one the organization had with former 
president Sadat. Sadat instituted this strategic alliance after fearing that threat of a 
growing opposition force from Islamic organizations aligning with the MB. However, 
this political relationship did not last long between Sadat and Islamic organizations due to 
individual groups radical ambitions to overthrow the regimes. Therefore, the MB 
expanded its alliances with more non-Islamist parties to continue their own political 
agenda. The MBs first measure was to develop partnerships with the Wafd, Socialist 
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Labour and Socialist Liberal party’s.325 As a result, the MB became a major opposition 
force to the government with the new alliances. The MB has continued to remain as a 
strong opposition force to the government even though the group has faced crackdowns 
three times throughout Egypt’s history – in Royal Egypt, and twice under Nasser.326 
 The MBs political power through alliances with non-Islamist alliances was 
noticeable in 2000, when the MB won seats in the People’s Assembly of parliament, 
which shocked former president Mubarak. Mubarak began to implement a number of 
legal reforms as a result of this win. The constitution was amended to state political 
activity or political parties shall not be based on any religious background or foundation. 
In addition to this reform, Mubarak implemented anti-terrorism legislation that gave 
security forces the power to condemn any opposition activity. This resulted in the MB 
being banned from gaining legal party status. However, this did not impede on the MB 
establishing political gains. The MB has a history of maneuvering and further surviving 
in Egyptian politics. In all three times in which the Egyptian government implemented 
crackdowns, the organization has resurged in to society and further politics. Therefore, 
the strategic move by the MB to establish another entity came at no surprise. 
 In February of 2011, the MB established the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), 
which was able to gain legal party status and was victorious in the first parliamentary 
elections after ousting Mubarak.327 Between 2011-2012, the FJP was able to gain 
majority of the seats in parliament, thereby in charge of drafting a new constitution and 
further election MB member, Muhammad Morsi as president. As discussed in the 
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previous section, Morsi first measures attempted to sustain the cooperative relationship 
with the SCAF.328 However, what led to Morsi’s ousting appeared to be his pursuit of 
power. While Morsi appointed retired military officers to his cabinet, these were officers 
that agreed to operate under his authority. Later, it is said that Morsi granted himself full 
authority over the executive, legislative, and constitution council through a constitution 
declaration.329Morsi pushed to get the newly drafted constitution approved as public 
opposition began to react in protest due to his new reforms. Further Morsi authorized the 
armed forces to protect the government buildings and polling places until the draft 
constitution was voted on in December of 2012.330 
 After the constitution was approved clashes between anti-Morsi and supporters of 
the MB broke out in the cities around the Suez Canal. The violence continued to spread, 
which led to calls for Morsi’s resignation. Morsi’s opposition felt the MBs interest was 
put first before Egypt’s and he failed to bring peace to the region and implement the 
economic reforms as promised during his campaign.331 By June 30, 2013, millions of 
protesters called for Morsi’s resignation in the countries capital. Between the civil unrest 
and rising death tolls, the military ended up intervening by ousting Morsi. The military 
ousting Morsi ignited a campaign to crackdown on the MB. This crackdown was seen as 
the military being one with and for the people. Lieutenant Aba al-Latif of the police felt, 
the police had finally regained the trust of the police that was felt in the revolution of 
2011.332 
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 The military began to implement their own roadmap for Egypt, while arresting and 
detaining the MB senior leaders. The MB was recognized as a terrorist group and charged 
with the killings of protesters before and after Morsi was in office.333 With the military’s 
crackdown on the MB, there was a brewing anti-army sentiment that was voiced from the 
Salafist’s of Egypt. One of the Salafist groups called the Salafist al-Nu Party members 
questioned why the army who once supported the MB-led government now viewed them 
as terrorists:  
“…Did Al-Sisi and the intelligence just find out Morsi is a terrorist? Terrorism is 
to terrorize you, to put you in jail, to kidnap your son, to oppress you when you 
want to get your voice heard. What is happening now is a political game.”334 
During the campaign to combat terrorism or dismantle the MB, President Morsi was 
placed under house arrest after the military declared a state of emergency. 
 In January of 2014, Morsi and other MB members were trialed for accusations of 
conspiring with foreign extremist groups. Morsi was also accused of escaping prison 
prior to the elections. However, the evidence to prove both accusations remains unclear 
and the criminal trails have continued. With all of the military’s efforts to dissolve the 
MB, observers began to question if the military wanted to rule the government.335 
General Al-Sisi has denounced reports saying he does intend to run for president.336 The 
unraveling of the Egypt’s democratic elections did not result in an anti-democratic 
government resurging. Instead, the elections revealed a bureaucratic dilemma in Egypt 
that has been embedded in the political culture. The MB is a well-known Islamic political 
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organization to Egypt and is not new to working within constraints of the Egyptian 
government. This is an organization that has had a longstanding relationship with the 
Egyptian government decades prior to the Arab Spring. Egyptian history reveals that the 
MB was tolerated by the government as long as it restricted itself to Islamic social 
advocacy, remaining apolitical, restoring militia, and avoided criticizing the regimes and 
its polices. However, the MB that evolved into a electing presidential candidate is when 
the organization became a larger threat than ever before witnessed.  The Egyptian 
military previously has abided by the regime and executive leadership of their role in 
society; however, with Mubarak ousted and Morsi as president, this in fact threatened the 
military’s ability to finally operate politically independent from the government. Morsi 
was supported by the military, until he begin enacting his own political agenda. 
Therefore, this presents implications on the military’s own political agenda in Egypt 
moving forward in the democratic transition. Since the military has proclaimed the MB as 
a terrorist group, does this provide implications that Egyptians are calling for secularism 
in politics? In order to further analyze this perspective there has to be a discussion on 
Islam and Secularism in Egypt.  
Islamists and Secularists 
 The roadmap for Egypt led by General Al-Sisi in collaboration with other 
government officials was an approved referendum in January of 2014. The referendum 
calls for elections to take place this year with parliamentary and then presidential 
elections.337With the tentative elections expected to occur sometime in April, the interim 
President Mansour issued a decree to allow the electoral commission to begin preparing 
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for the upcoming elections. In addition, this decree makes the commission prohibited 
from legal challenge.338 This decree presents major implications on whether or not the 
new elections will be considered democratic. The elections have also been criticized 
based on the court order banning the MB from participating and other politicians claim 
there is limited freedom of political expression. Critics of this decree also say it provides 
a pathway for General Al-Sisi to run for president. General Al-Sisi previously denounced 
questions of whether or not he would run in the upcoming elections. However, in March 
General Al-Sisi announced he would be resigning from the military and running for 
president.339General Al-Sisi is predicted to win the elections based on his popularity, role 
in Egypt’s democratic transition since the ousting of Mubarak and support from the 
military. The upcoming elections are scheduled for May 26 to May 27 will put Egypt’s 
steps towards democratization to test once again.340 
 In the midst of all the chaos and protests in Egypt, there has been collaboration 
between Islamists and Secularists. The drafting of the new constitution for the second 
time encompasses an army representative, Islamist, liberal, and leftist parties, along with 
representatives from women groups and trade unions.341 There are reports that express 
the committees debates revolved around expanding religious minorities and women 
rights.342 The amendments released of Article 3 and 11 note the extension of guaranteed 
rights to all non-Muslims and gender equality in elected councils. Further the committee 
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inserted there will be restraints on the authority of the newly elected president.343 As the 
interim government continues to introduce new legislation, one of the biggest factors that 
has not been addressed is the military’s enterprises in the failing economy. Egypt’s 
weakening economy will play a major role in whether the newly elected president will be 
supported by the people. The upcoming elections and the military’s role in the 
government must be closely monitored to examine if Egypt will ever sustain a 
progressive transition to democracy.  
Summary of Tunisia vs. Egypt  
 The cases of Tunisia and Egypt both present different perspectives to the 
conventional wisdom. Tunisia’s progress in its democratic transition has a lot to do with 
the role of the Tunisian military, Islamic political organizations, and cooperation between 
Islamists and Secularists. The Tunisian military was always isolated from politics. The 
military first major intervention into politics was its refusal to condemn and combat the 
anti-Ben Ali demonstrations. In Tunisia, the Islamic political organizations were marginal 
in their role in politics and the Ennadha party was one of few who were able to capture 
electoral victory. While Tunisia does have violent Islamic organizations, the threat has 
not overshadowed the countries progress.  
 Tunisia arguably presents how the outcome of democratic elections will not result 
in an anti-democratic government. The Tunisian government recognized that the changes 
in the political system would have to take place in order to withstand the outcome of 
democratic elections. The cooperation between Islamist and secularist has strikingly 
made a major impact on the countries democratic transition. While the Ennadha party still 
holds the majority in the Constituent Assembly, the party has continued to denounce this 
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will have any impact on the way it governs Tunisia. The Ennadha’s opposition seems to 
be pleased with the reorganization of power with the president and prime minister not 
being members of the party. The Tunisian government has recently lifted the three-year 
state of emergency and has been praised by supporters such as the U.S. Tunisia may in 
fact continue to rise as the Arab Spring’s most prominent model of a Muslim democracy. 
 Egypt’s democratic transition has been unstable since Mubarak stepped down in 
February of 2011. The Egyptian military influence in politics has evolved significantly 
since its independence. Between the military officers holding positions in the president’s 
cabinet and further acting as governors across the region, it is hard to determine where 
the military’s influence stops. What makes the Egyptian military different is that over the 
years, the military has established enterprises and gained control over a large number of 
state-owned businesses. In addition to the longstanding military and economic 
advisement form the U.S. The military has been able to maintain its revenue, while acting 
as a head of state for the government as it sees fit.  
 Another factor in Egypt is the tensions between the MB and the military. The MB 
has had a relationship with the Egyptian government and the military. However, what 
unraveled in 2013 appeared to be more of political battle between the MB and the 
military. The military supported Morsi in the country’s first democratic elections but then 
begin to side with the MB opposition which led an ousting of the then president. Morsi 
showed collaborative efforts in favor of the military by granting them power over there 
own affairs, but also sought powers to secure his presidency. Unfortunately, the 
military’s disapproval of Morsi’s initiatives led to the dissolution of the MB-led 
government.  
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 In the midst of the protests and violence that spread across the region as a result of 
the military’s decision, General Al-Sisi declared the MB a terrorist organization. 
Therefore, the jailing, detaining, and killing of MB senior leaders and members were 
justified in the name of counterterrorism. The MB stands as Egypt’s oldest and largest 
Islamic political organization with democratic founding principles. How did this 
organization become a terrorist organization in 2013? This appears to be a strategy by the 
military to remove the MB from having any further influence in the country. Since the 
military has gone unchallenged in Egypt, it is clear that the MB posed some type of threat 
that the military would not allow. 
 The Egyptian military has ousted two presidents without any resistance from the 
government. General Al-Sisi was once adamant in keeping the military’s role as is 
without running in the president elections. However, General Al-Sisi has recently 
changed his stance and is currently running in the countries presidential elections 
schedule for the end of May. General Al-Sisi’s vision democracy for Egypt is at the 
people will and freedom of choice. Further the opinions of Egyptians shall not be 
influenced or forced on by the government. Al-Sisi’s opponent is Hamdeen Sabahi, who 
previously ran against Morsi. The outcome of the election is highly favored towards Al-
Sisi; therefore, it will be interesting to examine the democratic reforms implemented and 
or continued this year for Egypt. 
Recommendations and Conclusion 
 Tunisia and Egypt are both at critical points in their pursuit of democracy. Tunisia 
is charged with sustaining peace among Tunisians, Islamist and Secularist. Egypt is on 
the brink of new elections and still battling the chaos of societal unrest. The process of 
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building and sustaining a democracy requires a solid infrastructure. This type of 
infrastructure is not easily built and comes with trial and error. As this research presents, 
democratic elections do not necessarily result in anti-democratic governments; instead, 
the outcomes reveal bureaucratic issues that can be positive or negative for a country 
depending on the military’s role in politics, Islamic political organizations, and the 
cooperation or lack there of between Islamist and Secularist. Tunisia’s case presents 
when the military involvement is controlled, Islamic political organizations are fewer 
extremists, and secularism is infused in politics, Islamist in government can be positive 
for democracy. Contrary for Egypt, a stronger military presence in politics creates a 
power struggle with Islamic political organizations such as the MB. This power struggle 
fuels societal unrest and as a result overshadows any cooperation between Islamist and 
Secularist. However, Egypt’s military intervention in politics is similar in nature to the 
Turkish democracy. This presents the question of how much military is necessary in 
securing democracy and further suppressing Islamic opposition. The differentiating factor 
for Egypt is the military’s more recent achievements in making civilian-military relations 
a prior versus the Turkey’s military history of enacting less favorable violent tactics to 
suppress religious monitories and secure secularism. The results of Egypt’s upcoming 
elections will begin to paint the picture for the role Egypt’s military will play in the future 
of the countries democratic transition.  
This research analyzed how the outcome of democratic elections reveal 
bureaucratic issues in the military’s role in politics, Islamic political organizations, and 
cooperation or lack there of between Islamist and secularist become that can hinder 
democratic transitions. The democratic elections held in Tunisia and Egypt did not result 
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in a resurgence of anti-democratic regimes; however, they did reveal how the factor 
above have contributed to one countries success in democratization over another. In 
Tunisia the Ennadha party is working with other non-Islamic party’s in the pursuit of 
democracy. The Tunisian government is developing into a potential model for the 
countries of the Arab Spring, which provides implications on the future of democracy in 
the MENA region. In order to do so, the government will have to continue strengthening 
the economy, infusing secular reforms, and monitor extremist threats from the Salafists. 
The case of Egypt presents another factor that was not discussed in detail in this research, 
which is the economy. The Egyptian government will have to address the military’s role 
in the economy and the increasing unemployment rate. The reformation of the economy 
will present a variety of factors including Egypt’s problems of the military’s role in 
politics, Islamic political organizations and the cooperation of Islamist and Secularist. 
Therefore, the Egyptian government should continue to focus on building a sold 
infrastructure, if it hopes to ever be able to sustain a democracy. Tunisia and Egypt are 
the countries of the Arab Spring, who are continuing to test the viability of democracy in 
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The term Arab Spring is used to describe a series of violent uprisings in the name 
of democracy that occurred in the MENA region. The chaos that erupted in one country 
spilled over into the borders of neighboring countries. Between 2010 and 2011, Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Libya was immersed in massive violent protests and demonstrations. While 
the MENA region is not new to protests and demonstrations from opposition groups, the 
protestors of the Arab Spring were quite different. The purpose of this thesis was to 
examine and analyze the events of uprisings to determine why the events occurred and 
what implications it will have on the future of Muslim democracies.  This thesis takes an 
methodological approach by examining the social, political, and ideological aspects of 
the Arab Spring.   
The social aspect of the Arab Spring discussion begins with a literature review to 
analyze the theories revolution, micromobilization, rational choice and domino. The 
theories established the framework to further analyze what factors contributed to the 
uprisings. The citizens who rose up in the Arab Spring were young, unemployed, and 
some were college-educated. The protests started at the grassroots level with lower class 
citizens who did not belong to a formal political organization. This provides implications 
that the reasons for the Arab Spring involved social issues of social injustices, oppression 
and repression, along with poverty. The social issues were discussed as pre-existing 
conditions that contributed to the uprisings.  
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After the analysis of the pre-existing conditions concluded, the political and 
ideological aspects of the Arab Spring were examined. The political and ideological 
aspects of the Arab Spring are analyzed throughout the entire thesis; however, the last 
two chapters analyze the implications on the sustainability of future Muslim democracies. 
The second chapter questions the compatibility of Islam and Liberal democracy. The 
analysis of this question is meant to examine the initial challenges of Islam and secular 
pluralism. This analysis reveals the U.S. must change its method of promoting liberal 
democracy based on democratic elections in the Middle East. In past years, when the U.S. 
institutes democratic pressures on autocratic regimes, the results render temporary 
democratic reforms that become illiberal. Further the internal and external factors of 
political Islam, power, unity and foreign intervention play a significant role in a countries 
ability to sustain a democracy. Egypt and Tunisia are both faced with challenges with the 
factors due partially to the colonial heritage left behind by European imperial powers. 
Turkey has been debated as the most comparable model for the countries of the Arab 
Spring. This chapter examines the Turkish democracy to determine if Tunisia and Egypt 
can implement similar secular reforms in their democratic transitions.  
The final chapter of this thesis examines the factors that have contributed to 
Tunisia’s progress and Egypt’s regression in democratization. The conventional wisdom 
of democratic transitions argues that democratic elections result in the resurgence of anti-
democratic regimes. However, the democratic elections in Tunisia and Egypt did not 
result in Islamic militant anti-democratic regimes. Tunisia and Egypt are at two different 
points in their democratic transition yet; the factors present a common analysis that is 
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significant for both countries, which are the military’s role in politics, Islamic political 
organizations and cooperation between Islamist and secularist. 
 The Arab Spring was a new phenomenon that shined light on historical issues of 
the MENA. While the major themes of this research such as Islam, liberal democracy, 
secularism have been written about previously; however, this thesis yields new 
implications for how future Muslim democracies should be analyzed. First, democratic 
elections in the Middle East are no longer enough to ensure democracy will be 
established. Democratic elections in the Middle East have become more procedural 
because as presented they typically lead to Islamist governance. However, the Islamist 
presence in governance can coexist with democratic institutions as witnessed in Turkey 
and now Tunisia. This thesis presents the challenges of the compatibility with Islam and 
liberal democracy. The challenges extend themselves beyond the traditionalist view of 
Islam to the U.S. promotion of liberal democracy. Bush’s democracy domino theory and 
the mishaps of the Iraqi democracy as discussed prove further the U.S. must changes its 
foreign policy in regards to promoting democracy.  
The countries of the Arab Spring experienced decades of limited participation, 
political competition, and free and fair elections were nonexistent. In Egypt and Libya, 
political Islam was infused in governance to legitimize the presidents. The Tunisian case 
presented secularism in the name of modernization after independence, but the reforms 
failed to have long-term effect. For all of the countries of the Arab Spring, Islam is 
known as a factor of identity and unity. As a result, this thesis presents how this has been 
manipulated by regimes to centralize power. Given the historical factors of the MENA, 
the countries are faced with the challenges of reforming Islamic cultures, legitimacy, and 
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political competition, all while restoring failing economies. Muslim Democracies are 
marginal and unique in the global world. Therefore, this thesis contributes to the 
understanding of specific factors that will act as the determinants of sustainability for 
future Muslim democracies.  
Chapter 1 of this thesis sought to examine how and why the uprisings occurred 
beyond the argument of the U.S. promotion of democracy in Iraq. This analysis involved 
defining the term revolution, examining the cultural transformation and using theories to 
assess how the uprisings occurred. In reviewing existing theories of revolution, it was 
discovered that Tunisia, Egypt and Libya experienced revolutions and Iran witnessed a 
series of massive protests. The occurrence of the revolution is discussed through the 
micromobilization, rational choice and domino theory. The micromobilization theory 
provided support for the role of social media in the uprisings. Through the use of social 
media such as Facebook and Youtube, protestors were able to initiate campaigns, form 
informal associations, collaborate and exchange ideas in support of ousting their existing 
leaders. This type of communication allowed citizens of Egypt to witness what was 
happening in Tunisia, promote the awareness of social injustices, and their reasons for the 
uprisings. The rational choice theory aided in the understanding how the protests drew 
massive crowds based on each individuals decisions to act during that situation. The 
campaigns, petitions, and rallies promoted the benefits of ousting the dictators, which in 
turn encouraged each individual to join the movement. The domino theory provides 
support for the uprisings in the MENA influencing one another based on their geographic 
location.  
 107  
The discussion of the theories in the literature review provided the foundation for 
the study of how and why the uprising of the Arab Spring occurred. The analysis 
proceeds with refuting the conventional and discussing the commonalities of political 
oppression, poverty, religious and ethnic conflicts as it relates to Tunisia, Egypt and 
Libya. The results of this analysis indicate that all the factors existed in the countries for 
decades prior to the uprisings of the Arab Spring. Therefore, the U.S. implementation of 
the Iraqi democracy may have encouraged democracy in the MENA but arguably falls 
short of being a direct result of the uprisings. Further the analysis reveals an important 
differentiating factor in the U.S. intervention in Iraq and the Arab Spring, which is that 
the people without foreign involvement initiated the uprisings and calls for democracy in 
the Arab Spring. Even though in the case of Libya, the NATO intervened. Lastly the 
analysis of Iran presents indication of a forthcoming revolution, if the government does 
not implement democratic reforms in favor of the people.  
The analysis of how and why the uprisings occurred in the Arab Spring prompts 
the second analysis of the compatibility between Islam and democracy. Chapter 2 of this 
presents the questions of the compatibility between Islam and liberal democracy to 
examine the reasons why Muslim democracies are marginal and less sustainable in the 
Arab world. The existing theory Islam and democracy assert the two are not compatible 
based on the history of authoritarian regimes regaining control in the Arab world. 
Contrary to theory, the lack of sustainability in Muslim democracies stems the factors of 
political Islam, power, past and present foreign intervention. The factors are discussed 
throughout this chapter as they relate to the Egypt and Tunisia. While marginal in the 
Arab world, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia and Bangladesh, are examples of Muslim 
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Democracies. Turkey is analyzed as the most comparable models for the countries to 
determine what factors have contributed to its democracy.  
As a result of this pressure, the former autocratic dictators have implemented 
temporary democratic reforms in the past to please the international community. The U.S. 
and Europe’s both have long-standing ties with Muslim countries throughout the world. 
Therefore, the illiberal politics of the authoritarian regimes were not new issues. In times 
intensified violence and human right abuses, the international community reacted by 
advocating for Muslim countries to implement democratic reforms. The Egyptian 
government under Mubarak allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to openly campaign during 
elections but prohibited the party from receiving legal party status. In Tunisia, Ben Ali, 
enacting similar reforms in the minimizing political opposition.  
The study of Egypt and Tunisia present the historical issues of political Islam, 
power, past and present foreign intervention. The analysis of Turkey provides 
implications on how the countries can work avoid the factors further influencing their 
democratic transitions. Turkey, like Tunisia, has a history secular reforms and 
modernization in governance. The demise of the Tunisian governments initial 
implementation of secularism under Bourguiba was the lack of enforcement and proper 
infrastructure. The Turkish government implemented a state-controlled secularism that 
was enforced by the military. In Tunisia, the military was isolated from politics. 
However, Turkey’s accession to the EU provides additional insight on what implemented 
into the democratic transitions of Tunisia and Egypt. Through Turkey’s accession to the 
EU, the government has been forced to guarantee the rights of religious and ethnic 
minority groups. In addition to, lifting historical constraints on the practice of Islam. In 
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turn the Turkish government has increased political competition and participation. 
Islamist, Secularist and other parties are working together in the pursuit of accession to 
the EU. Tunisia and Egypt essentially have to implement inclusive reforms that 
encourage political competition. As a result, the citizens should witness more 
collaboration in governance from different parties. The analysis of Turkish democracy 
present the factors of the military’s role in politics and the cooperation between Islamist 
and Secularist that are discussed in the final chapter.  
The final chapter of this thesis examines the last two years of democratic 
transitions in Tunisia and Egypt. The last two years for both countries have been mixed 
with progress and chaos. In the case of Egypt, the first democratic elections resulted in 
the Islamist party victory of the MB. Mohamed Morsi, member of the MB was elected 
president in June of 2012, served for ousted by the military in July of 2013. In Tunisia, 
the free and fair elections resulted in the Islamist victory of the Ennadha party. The 
Ennadha party has drafted a new constitution, implemented democratic reforms 
guarantying the rights of religious minorities, and further cooperated with secularist 
parties. The conventional wisdom of democratic transitions suggests democratic elections 
provide political space for Islamists to resurge in governance, which negatively impacts 
the possibility of democracy. The democratic transitions of Tunisia and Egypt present 
two perspectives of the conventional wisdom. The perspectives are analyzed through the 
factors of the military’s role in politics, Islamic political organizations and the 
cooperation between Islamist and secularist to determine their impact on democratization.   
In the case of Tunisia, the military maintained an apolitical role until the military 
decided to denounce Ben Ali’s request to retaliate against protesters in the uprisings of 
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the Arab Spring. The Islamic political organizations in Tunisia are marginal in their 
influence in politics and extremist views. The history of Islamic political organizations in 
Tunisia reveal pro-democratic movements linked the Ennadha party in current times. 
Further the Ennadha party has shown their willingness to cooperate with secularist and 
other parties in the pursuit of democracy. The newly elected Constituent Assembly 
includes Islamist, secularist and independents parties. The results of this cooperation have 
led to an increase in genuine democratic reforms. The Ennadha party further agreed to 
elect a member of the Congress Republic Party as president and an independent candidate 
as prime minister. The analysis of Tunisia presents a counterargument to the conventional 
wisdom in regards to Islamist parties in governance being positive in the process of 
democratization.  
 The case of Egypt provides support for the conventional wisdom based on the 
result of the first democratic elections. However, the factors that have contributed to their 
regression will potentially determine if the country will ever be able to sustain a 
democracy. The Egyptian military has a long-standing history of being influential in 
politics and has continued in current times. Military officials were appointed as governors 
and officials in regulatory bureaucracies. The military was also able to acquire private 
enterprises and regulate its own defense budgets. Therefore, it came to no surprise when 
the military stepped in after the resignation of Mubarak to declare a roadmap for Egypt. 
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) continued to expand military 
businesses and further implement reforms in favor the military. After the democratic 
elections of Morsi, the military became unhappy with the presidents assertion of power 
and sided with the MB opposition. In a declaration for the people, the military prompted 
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the resignation of Morsi and the arrests of MB members. The arrests of the MB members 
were a part of a military’s counterterrorism plan.  
 The MB is Egypt’s oldest and largest Islamic political party; therefore, the sudden 
classification of terrorists shocked non-MB supporters. The military appeared to 
reasserting its unique role in military politics and sought to eliminate further influence of 
any opposition. The MB has had relationships with the military and previous dictators for 
decades. However, the party gained control in the Egyptian government, any previous 
ties with the organization was denied by the military. In midst of the chaos in Egypt, the 
cooperation between Islamist and secularist has been overshadowed. The military has 
kept its unique role in government, but has allowed other parties to draft a new 
constitution. The recent revisions of the constitution show democratic reforms in 
guarantying religious rights and gender equality. Therefore, the case of Egypt presents 
how the factors of the military’s role in politics, Islamic political organizations, and a 
lack of cooperation between Islamist and secularist can be detrimental to the 
sustainability of democracy.  
Overall the uprisings of the Arab Spring present new implications and factors that 
will determine the sustainability of Muslim democracies in the MENA region. While this 
thesis has covered the factors presented in the past three years, the outcomes of the Arab 
Spring are far from over. The purpose of this thesis was to determine how and why the 
uprisings occurred, in addition to the implications they revealed on future of 
sustainability for Muslim democracies. The factors presented in tis thesis present a case 
for the new emergence of Muslim democracies that fall outside liberalism. As a result, 
this thesis leads to further research to characterize the new Muslim democracies 
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forthcoming in the Arab Spring. While it is easy for the U.S. to promote democracy, there 
is still a level of misunderstanding in regards to the type of democracy to promote in the 
Middle East. In recent times, the U.S. method of promoting liberal democracy has 
become systematic to a certain degree. This method involves encouraging or aiding in the 
removal of dictator by force, sending U.S. government officials to the country to aid in 
the transitional governments and further implement democratic elections.  In the view of 
U.S. foreign policymakers, democratic elections are quick and efficient way to ensure 
democracy. However, the events of the Arab Spring show that pre-existing characteristics 
of the liberal democracy are not enough to sustain democracy. The factors of the 
military’s role in politics, Islamic political organizations, and the cooperation of Islamist 
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